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West Europe Report

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SEDLE ISSUES POLICY DIRECTIVE ON NUCLEAR ARMS THREAT

Helsinki KANSAN UUTISLAT in Finnish 1 May 84 p 7

[Text] In the opinion of the SEDLE [Finnish People's Democratic League], in assessing the threat nuclear weapons pose to Finland, there is also reason to devote our attention to the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used against targets on Finnish territory or that our country might be threatened by nuclear weapons.

"If a nuclear war should break out in Europe, Finland will most likely fall within its sphere of influence both directly and indirectly," the SEDLE administration emphasized in a position paper published yesterday.

The party administration specifically felt that the changes that have occurred in nuclear armament and nuclear strategies have also increased the immediate threat to Finland produced by nuclear weapons.

In light of current developments, in their statement they consider to be untenable assumptions to the effect that our country might become the target of the effects of nuclear weapons in a nuclear war, primarily only due to fallout coming from elsewhere or missiles that have strayed into our territory.

According to the SEDLE, the increased threat of nuclear weapons requires a thorough appraisal of Finland's security policy situation, one which cannot be the job of Foreign Affairs Ministry officials and the military alone.

As the SEDLE sees things, one point of departure for such an appraisal is the fact that Finland's response to the growing threat of nuclear weapons cannot be a military one; rather it must primarily be a political one.

The SEDLE administration feels that Finland does not have the material wherewithal to construct effective surveillance and defense systems against cruise missiles.

In the position paper endorsed and published by the SEDLE administration on Monday, they stress Finland's readiness to relieve tension, establish nuclear-free zones and promote actions that will increase trust in Europe.

In the position paper they stress reduction of the number of nuclear weapons in Europe and banning of the development of nuclear tests and weapons.

In it they express the opinion that, if the countries of Western Europe were to achieve independence from the United States, the situation in Europe would be a healthier one and they feel that it is indispensable for us to gradually do away with a bipolar world order based on the fear of nuclear warfare on both sides.

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CSO: 3617/154

CONTRIBUTION OF DUTCH ARMED FORCES TO NATO

Huyser on Dutch Role

The Hague ONS LEGER in Dutch Apr 84 pp 9-10, 13-14

[Article by General G.L.J. Huyser, chief of staff for defense: "The Netherlands and the Defense of Western Europe"; passages enclosed in slant-lines, printed in italics]

[Text] Choice for the Alliance

Even before the end of the Second World War, on 26 June 1945, the Charter of the United Nations was signed in San Francisco by 50 countries. The Netherlands, which had regained its freedom only a few weeks earlier, was also represented. With the United Nations, whose main task was to maintain international peace and security, people thought that they had finally found a way to prevent a third world war. Especially in the Netherlands, expectations were high in this respect.

However, a few years later it became clear already that in spite of this newly devised international legal order, the countries in Western Europe saw themselves increasingly threatened by the continuing expansionist activities of the Soviet Union. When in February 1948, as a result of a communist coup, Czechoslovakia fell definitively within Moscow's sphere of influence, initiatives were developed in Western Europe and in North America for a joint defense system. The Berlin blockade, as of June 1948, gave an extra impulse to this development. From the very beginning, the Netherlands -- where everywhere people wanted to see the former neutrality policy delegated for good to a museum -- was actively involved in these initiatives. Hence, it was no wonder that parliament was virtually unanimous in ratifying membership of the Netherlands in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization set up on 4 April 1949.

Role of the Netherlands in NATO

A glance at a map clarifies two things. In the first place, the defense of the Dutch territory is unthinkable without an adequate defense of the territory and air space of the FRG on the one hand, and of the area of the North Sea and the Northern Atlantic Ocean on the other hand.

Secondly, the Netherlands plays an important role in the supply of reinforcements for the central region of Europe, a task which is not feasible without adequate defense of the territory of the Netherlands, the air space above it and the maritime access routes.

Simplified, the conclusion from all of this could be formulated as follows: the Netherlands cannot do without NATO and NATO cannot do without the Netherlands. Reality is of course somewhat more nuanced, but it is clear that the role of the Netherlands forms a vital link in the defense system of the alliance. This carries with it that, first of all, the Netherlands can be expected to make a substantial contribution to the land, air and naval forces of NATO in the central sector, respectively on the North Sea and in the North Atlantic maritime area. Accordingly, our country has made that contribution from the very beginning, and the 1984 Defense Memorandum states that this contribution will be maintained in the future.

Given the geographic location of the Netherlands described above, an equally important contribution to NATO is the security of the territory of the Netherlands itself. It is precisely this aspect of the allied defense which has received more attention in recent years, and therefore we shall return to this later.

In recent years the share of the Dutch defense budget has fluctuated between 3.2 and 3.5 percent of the gross national product. In 1981, the Netherlands spent 3.2 percent of its GNP on defense. For Greece that share was 7 percent, for the FRG 3.4 percent, and for the United States 5.9 percent.

The interpretation of these figures is always a difficult matter. Thus it should be recalled that, like most of the other European allies, the Netherlands has made a choice in principle in favor of the system of compulsory military service. This not only guarantees a continuous interaction between society and the armed forces, something which is highly valued in our country, and rightly so, but it also means lower personnel costs. Another aspect is the motivation and training of the personnel.

In fact, the real value of the defense effort in our country cannot be expressed in terms of money. Indeed, it is not only a question of how much is being spent on defense, but especially also what is being done with that money, and what product is ultimately delivered. Figures say little about the /quality/ of the defense effort.

Agreement has never been reached within the alliance about what is a reasonable distribution of the defense burden. Neither are there any NATO criteria to determine that defense burden itself. What is involved in both cases is political estimates made by each of the member states. All the allies agree that there should be a reasonable distribution of the burden but each country has its own views on the subject. However, there is unanimous recognition that what one country contributes is related directly to what the other allies contribute.

In recent years, noises have been heard in the United States, specifically in Congress, to the effect that there is a lack of willingness in Western Europe to carry an "adequate" share in the common defense. At the request of Congress, the American secretary of state has, since 1981, made a yearly report on the actual contribution of the allies to the joint defense. These copiously documented reports also show that, like most of the other European allies, the Netherlands contributes a reasonable share.

How is the determination made within NATO context as to what material contribution a country should make to the common defense?

The points of departure for that are the so-called Force Goals. These Force Goals, which cover a period of 6 years, are developed on the basis of a two-year ministerial directive. This directive includes a number of estimates about political, economic and military factors, based on which the overall configuration of the NATO armed forces is determined.

An interim step is the drawing up of Force Proposals by the three supreme commanders of NATO (SACEUR, SACLANC and CINCHAN). There they each make proposals about the military contribution of every member state for a period of 6 years. Next, these proposals go to the Military Committee, which then makes concrete proposals for the total defense contribution of every country. As all NATO members, except for France and Spain, are represented on the Military Committee, the plans can be mutually adjusted.

At this point the Force Proposals are ripe to be shaped into Force Goals. This is done by the Defense Planning Committee[DPC]. The DPC meets twice a year at the ministerial level, and that offers the opportunity to present the Force Goals officially to the governments. That happens every year, so that one year is always added to the Force Goals, and so that, if necessary, the previous years can be adjusted.

Every year, the member states present their own defense plans to NATO. Those plans are first discussed with the NATO authorities, and then with the other allies within the Defense Review Committee. These discussions can lead to the changing of plans.

This is how the complete 5 year NATO plan, which is ultimately adopted by the ministers in the DPC, comes about.

Why all this attention to such a complicated procedure? I hope thus to have made it clear that every country's contribution to allied defense is not determined haphazardly. It is a process of a careful joint tuning of priorities, with as a result the best compromise between military necessity on the one hand, and political and financial feasibility on the other.

What is the actual contribution of the Netherlands to NATO? Elsewhere in this issue, the commanders of the various armed forces will provide details about the task and resources of their organizations. Thus I will limit myself here to the aspects which are most important to NATO.

Royal Navy

The core of the resources allocated to times of crises and war is formed by the four so-called escort groups. In principle, two of them are intended for the eastern part of the Atlantic Ocean, and two for the North Sea and the Channel.

The task of the NATO naval combat forces is to protect the sea links in the North Atlantic region; in this respect the Royal Navy concentrates itself on submarine warfare. As a matter of fact, the threat of the Soviet naval forces manifests itself most strongly in the large number of its submarines. This task requires not only surface ships equipped with helicopters, but also naval patrol planes and submarines. What is involved here is to trace, locate and eliminate enemy submarines in close cooperation with one another. It goes without saying that there is close cooperation among the allied navies: in the Channel and on the North Sea with the United Kingdom and Belgium, and on the Atlantic Ocean with the United States and the United Kingdom.

The most visible Dutch involvement in the joint maritime defense is manifested especially by its participation in the so-called Standing Naval Force Atlantic [STANAVFORLANT] and the Standing Naval Force Channel [STANAVFORCHAN].

In both cases, this involves a permanent peace time readiness group of ships from various NATO countries. The Royal Navy participates on a permanent basis in the first group with a frigate, and in the second group with two mine hunters.

The Marine Corps is also very much involved in the allied defense. British and Dutch marine units work closely together in the defense of the northern flank of NATO.

Royal Army

At the time of the establishment of NATO in 1949, it was especially the large size of the land forces of the Soviet union which represented a threat to Western Europe. Not only has this size increased, but the quality of the land forces has also continuously improved. This does not apply solely to the equipment, but also to the organization, the training and the logistic support.

This development emphasizes the importance of maintaining a forward defense in Europe. The Netherlands contributes to this with the First Army Corps of the Royal Army. Together with the army corps from Belgium, the FRG and the United Kingdom, the First Army Corps' task is to defend and safeguard the northern part of the central sector (the FRG).

Of the Dutch First Army Corps, in addition to five ready brigades in the Netherlands, one ready tank brigade with a few supporting units is stationed in the northern part of the FRG.

At wartime strength, the First Army Corps includes 10 brigades with a total of 87,000 individuals. They have to defend an area in the North-German plains about 100 kilometers wide and 170 kilometers deep. Within 48 hours, 6 of the 10 brigades can be deployed on those plains. The mobilization of the non-ready units is based to an important extent on the Direct Mobilizable Inflow [RIM] system, which has become widely famous. With this system, among other things, the team spirit built up during the first exercise is maintained, which is part of the reason why such a mobilizable unit can be deployed quickly. The intention is to introduce this system on a broader scale in the coming years.

Royal Air Force

Dominance of the air space is a first requisite for a successful defense of Western Europe. It is true that in recent years the number of Warsaw Pact aircraft has remained steady, but their quality has greatly improved. And there is the additional factor that, among other things, through their greater range, these airplanes are increasingly offensive in character.

This development makes it all the more necessary for the NATO air forces to be immediately deployable; it is only in this way that one can talk of a credible deterrence. For this reason, even in peace time all tactical units of the Royal Air Force are under the command of the Second Allied Tactical Air Force [2ATAF].

The task of the Royal Air Force is to ensure air dominance in the central sector, to provide air support to the NATO land forces, and to protect the NATO fleet links. This takes place of course in close cooperation with the air forces of the other allies in the central sector, including the United States.

The defense of the European air space is ensured not only by airplanes, but also by guided weapons stationed on the ground. For a great many years already, the Netherlands has provided an important part of the two air defense belts in the FRG.

Plans to replace the Nike type guided weapons, which also have a nuclear capability, with the conventional Patriot system have a double meaning.

First of all, the Dutch government thus makes it clear that it is interested in maintaining the integrated air defense of Western Europe. That interest is not solely of a military nature, but especially also of a political one: it is a demonstration of the will for a joint defense.

Secondly, the introduction of the Patriot represents an actual reduction of dependence on nuclear arms. Thus we get to the next item.

Contribution by the Netherlands to Nuclear Deterrence

The 1984 Defense Memorandum states that the government also wants to maintain the nuclear contribution to allied defense in the future.

The contribution by the Royal Army consists primarily of one division of 203 millimeter Howitzers and one division of Lance surface to surface missiles; both arms systems can be used both as nuclear and as conventional systems. The above mentioned British, Belgian and German army corps, which together with the First Dutch Army Corps provide the forward defense in the northern part of the FRG, provide a similar contribution to nuclear deterrence. In this way, enemy armed forces would be faced with the impossibility of avoiding the risk of nuclear deployment on the side of NATO. And that contributes to the prevention of war.

The Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy are also involved in nuclear deterrence. In addition to the Niketype guided weapons described above, which will be replaced by the conventional Patriot system, two airplane squadrons of the Royal Air Force have the capability of dropping nuclear bombs on ground targets. Close cooperation also exists here with the allied contributions: the other air forces of 2ATAF have a corresponding task.

Finally, the Royal Navy's Orion naval patrol planes have the capability of dropping nuclear depth charges. As long as no effective conventional combat means have been developed, this kind of weapon provides the only chance for success in fighting the modern submarines of the Soviet Union.

The government will make a decision about the future of the whole Dutch involvement in NATO's nuclear deterrent in the spring. An important guide in this respect is the so-called Montebello decision of October 1983. On that occasion the ministers of defense, meeting together in the Nuclear Planning Group [NPG], decided to unilaterally reduce the number of theater nuclear arms. This reduction, which will amount to 1400 by 1988, is the result of the setting of criteria which the theater nuclear arms as a whole must meet.

The most important point of departure in this respect is that the presence of those arms makes sense only if they contribute to the main goal of NATO: the prevention of war. In short, the most important function of nuclear arms is a political one.

Role of Dutch Territory

At the beginning of this article I pointed to the importance of protecting the territory of the Netherlands. It is true that this protection is a national responsibility, but it involves the whole alliance. It is the task of the Netherlands to make sure that the supply and transportation lines, along which the allied armed forces must arrive and leave can really be used.

Those lines run over sea, over land and through the air, which means that the protection of the territory of the Netherlands includes a task for /all/ branches of the armed forces.

In the Royal Army, this responsibility lies with the National Territorial Command [NTC]. The task of the NTC is focussed on providing direct support to allied units on Dutch territory; in NATO terminology this is called "Host Nation Support." This also includes, for example, keeping the road network

open, something which will be done in close cooperation with the civilian authorities. The involvement of the Royal Navy in the protection of supply and transportation lines is focussed, as a matter of course, on keeping open Dutch ports and naval access routes. Especially keeping the coastal waters and ports free of mines would be of the utmost importance in times of war.

Especially during the first phase of any un hoped for conflict, the airfields located on Dutch territory, civilian as well as military, will have to be kept open. The first defense line against invading airplanes is formed by the two air defense belts in the FRG and by the airplanes of 2ATAF. For the defense of military airfields in the Netherlands the Royal Air Force has at its disposal seven ready units equipped with Hawk guided weapons and with anti-aircraft guns.

For the protection of the most important airports and sea ports, the plans provide for the establishment of a number of Patriot units; this shows the importance given to keeping these supply and transportation points open.

Conclusion

In the above I have tried to make it clear that the Dutch contribution to allied defense involves much more than ships, tanks and airplanes. As a matter of fact, attention has been drawn to the less obvious aspects of that contribution, aspects which often can not very well be translated in financial terms. Moreover, it is definitely not true that the financial limits have not led to problems. In recent years necessary investments have had to be postponed. Reductions of the so-called operating costs have led to a not always prompt supply of spare parts. Fuel limitations have led -- albeit fortunately only temporarily -- to a reduction in sailing, driving and flying hours. In the coming years, priority will be given specifically to improving the use of equipment. In addition, all of this did not stop the process of complete modernization of the equipment of the Dutch armed forces. For that reason and because professionalism, leadership and very good voluntary service and conscripted personnel are available within the armed forces as a whole, I am convinced that the contribution of the Netherlands to the joint defense remains of an unchanged high quality.

Hulsof on Navy

The Hague ONS LEGER in Dutch Apr 84 pp 18-20, 23

[Article by Vice Admiral J.H.B. Hulsof, commander of the naval forces: "The Royal Navy, Instrument of Dutch Government Policy"]

[Text] It is with pleasure that I comply with the request of the editorial staff of ONS LEGER to provide a naval contribution to this special issue. The reader will undoubtedly understand that it is not my intention to throw light on the Royal Navy from the same angle as the one recently published in the Defense Memorandum. I prefer to share with the reader my views on a number of background conditions which are related to the tasks and significance of the Royal Navy.

I will successively deal with:

- the rationale of the Royal Navy, that is to say its justification;
- considerations of a strategic nature;
- tasks and means.

Rationale

It would be too easy to justify the Royal Navy by referring solely to the demands made by NATO, even though they are well founded in all aspects seen in the totality of the alliance.

The substantial financial, personal and material efforts are not being made exclusively because the alliance requests them from the Netherlands. The results of those efforts must also be clearly demonstrated in the sense that the Netherlands benefits from them. Parliament will have to be convinced of the need for the existence of the Royal Navy before it will allocate money to it; in other words, it must be convinced of the main purpose of the Royal Navy: to provide fighting power at sea in order to support the policy of the Dutch government. What has just been written here is nothing other than that the Royal Navy is one of the instruments at the service of the Dutch government to carry out and shape its policy, and to influence positively the interests of the state of the Netherlands in the broadest possible sense of the word. All of this, naturally, taking into account the scale on which the Netherlands can have an effect on the world scene. Decisions relating to the composition of the Royal Navy and its service will have to be directed within this thought process toward strengthening the position of the Netherlands in the world. This approach is independent of the Atlantic Alliance and does not involve solidarity with other countries either.

And we are not going to bring up the fleet composition considered desirable by NATO either; those are after all derived quantities. What is involved here is the fact that the right of existence of the Royal Navy is anchored in its policy support role for the Dutch government.

The basic aspect of this approach of the Royal Navy lies in the fact that the self-interest of the kingdom of the Netherlands is in the forefront, and not that of any other body. As Dutch governments have been and are consistent in their opinion that the interests of the Netherlands are served by participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it is also in the interest of the Netherlands to do this as a reliable and loyal member, that is to say a member which accepts the consequences and meets the commitments it has made. However, the Netherlands will prefer to make a contribution to the alliance with those armed forces which best serve its primary objective.

Before continuing with the next paragraph I would like to ask the reader not to draw any premature conclusions. My main argument will be that the Netherlands has a number of very good arguments for maintaining a navy which could be deployed worldwide. What I am obviously not saying is that the policy support argument is characteristic only of the Royal Navy. As a matter of fact, if a conflict elsewhere in the world were to escalate to such an extent that there

is talk of actual hostilities between Warsaw Pact units on the one hand and Western units on the other hand, then it will be possible to prevent hostilities in Central Europe only if there is an effective deterrent. This indicates the need for complementary branches of the armed forces.

Strategic Considerations

The common motive of the NATO member states is an honest and sincere striving for peace, if possible in the whole world, but in any case in the primary interest area of the organization.

It has been determined within NATO that the strategy of deterrence is the most effective way to achieve this goal. The Netherlands heartily subscribes to that and also finds in it a source of inspiration for solidarity with the allies. But it is precisely here that the opposition occurs between, on the one hand, unconditional solidarity and, on the other hand, a constant and determined maintenance of self-interest. As long as both aspects are kept in line to such an extent that the primary objective is fully maintained, the compromises to be concluded are acceptable.

Assuming that deterrence is the name of the game and that this will remain true for a considerable period of time, a number of subjects need to be touched on, specifically:

- what threat does exist and who must be deterred;
- where will the threat be most likely to develop;
- when will the threat develop;
- why must the Netherlands play the important role it has set for itself at sea?

Assuming that we continue to take the right measures (and I would quickly state here that our other branches of the armed forces play a vital role in these right measures), I believe that the ignition of a conflict will not take place in Western Europe.

The Soviet Union cannot afford to forget the history of Russia. Virtually without exception, wars have devastated the country. This has instilled in it awe and fear for any power in Central Europe able to bring war to the territory of the Soviet Union. Hence, it may also be assumed that the Soviet objective will be to have actual hostilities take place outside its territory. More than that even: as long as Soviet territory is threatened with devastation, a status quo in Europe will be preferable to the Soviet Union. I consider the probability much greater of a conflict originating in an unstable area elsewhere in the world. Advanced weapons, such as Exocet and Gabriel, can be found in ever greater numbers among the naval forces of relatively small Third World countries.

Recent developments in maritime law could also have a disturbing effect on regimes which have been in effect on the seas from of old. The broadening of the territorial sea from 3 to 12 nautical miles, for example, has placed about a hundred existing trade routes, which used to go through the open seas, under a different jurisdiction. And even though guarantees for free passage have been

established on paper, it is clear that the maritime awakening of the Third World could be an extra source of instability. Or, as was recently expressed by Sir James Cable: "There are more navies than rational governments." The disturbing factor in this is that the Soviet navy is expanding in a spectacular manner. Hence, the thing to do is to really keep an eye on potentially unstable situations in the periphery, there where the Soviet navy could play a decisive role. Furthermore, we should be aware of the capability the Soviets are gradually developing to deny the free use of overseas trade routes to countries which are dependent on them.

Seen in this light it is clear why the Soviet Union is in the process of expanding, especially its surface fleet, at such a high rate: large ships, well armed, with good self-defense capability and capable of operating for long periods of time far from their home base.

Obviously, the Western countries, including the Netherlands, cannot afford to be denied free use of the maritime trade routes. In this context, I would like to stress the following points:

- In comparison with other countries, the Netherlands is disproportionately dependent on the maritime trade routes;
- The nature of the hostilities we should expect on the seas is primarily surface warfare. Only in case it has been proven impossible to avert a threatening crisis will submarine warfare be expanded on a larger scale.

This is the strategic context which is developing not only for the Netherlands but for all NATO countries.

I explained earlier that the Royal Navy has a legitimate, intrinsic right of existence. This does not mean, however, that it would be possible for a small country to defend its interests by itself. The last time this was possible was three centuries ago.

In order for Dutch interests to be taken seriously by other countries, a number of consequences must be kept in mind:

- The contribution of the Netherlands to the alliance must be such that the allies not only value this contribution, but also realize that their own interests would be less protected if the Dutch contribution were to be lacking;
- The composition of the military contribution must be such that it benefits the whole spectrum of warfare;
- The contribution must be big enough to guarantee flexibility with regard to time and place of deployment;
- A part of the armed forces must be available on a continuous basis;
- The professionalism of the contribution must command respect.

In other words, in order for maritime deterrence to be effective it is necessary for one's own naval forces to be visible to the potential opponent, so that their capacity for readiness and professionalism in action can be ascertained. Furthermore, the effectiveness of deterrence also requires continuity and an intensive presence on the scene of operations with qualitatively good naval combat forces.

Without the assurance of safe supply routes deterrence in Europe will be dependent to an even more significant extent upon the presence of nuclear arms. If at any time the role of nuclear arms is reduced, it will be even more important than it already is under the present circumstances to ensure the security of supply routes to Europe. This aspect of deterrence also needs to be given continued attention.

The efforts of the Royal Navy are directed toward fulfilling the above mentioned conditions.

Tasks

The following activities flow directly or indirectly from the above mentioned main objective:

- To participate in crisis control, both within a NATO and a national context. As was noted, an important factor here is the so-called "maritime presence" of permanent NATO fleet links (STANDING NAVAL FORCE ATLANTIC, STANDING NAVAL FORCE CHANNEL) and participation in large NATO exercises;
- To carry out coordinated maritime reconnaissance operations with naval patrol planes, submarines and surface ships;
- To contribute to the defense of the territory on the NATO flanks and other areas vulnerable to aggression such as islands, with emphasis on the northern flank, with participation in the combined British-Dutch amphibious combat force;
- Anti-mine defense. To this effect, route survey operations are carried out already in peace time in order to map the environmental parameters (wrecks, etcetera) important to anti-mine defense on the shipping routes;
- Hydrography. Carrying out hydrographic, oceanographic and meteorological research in the area most relevant to the Royal Navy is very important among other things for submarine and anti-mine defense.

In addition to the tasks related to NATO, the Royal Navy fulfills several other tasks based on efficiency requirements or treaty stipulations, specifically:

- Fishing inspection;
- Search and rescue service;
- Support of the United Nations in carrying out naval peace operations;
- Showing the flag in support of diplomatic activities;
- Submerging and dismantling operations.

Means

A number of factors play a role in determining the optimal structure of the Royal Navy:

- The structure of the Royal Navy must in any case enable action in circumstances of crisis or war. Peace activities are carried out with the same means as those which must be available in times of war;

- Great value is attached to crisis control. In the composition of the fleet, an extra emphasis must be given to the function of surface ships, with which a directly visible combat capability can be maintained for a long period of time. The deterrent impact of such a ship is thus greater than that of other units;

- Taken into account is the concept of independently operating escort groups with related submarine and airplane support, which have been pledged as a whole to NATO.

Escort Ship Group

In order to be able to fulfill adequately the tasks relating to the points of departure mentioned above, about four escort groups should be available.

The composition of such an escort group is determined on the basis of experience and insight on the one hand, and with the aid of operations research techniques on the other hand.

Obviously, the answer will not be the same for all circumstances and for every operation, but a group consisting of one anti-aircraft command ship, six frigates and a supply ship is very common.

By striving for high intensity presence on the seas and thereby demonstrating professionalism and decisiveness, surface ships effectively contribute to deterrence.

Submarine Service

The submarine service has at its disposal: four submarines of the Dolfijn-Potvis class and two submarines of the Swordfish class. Two submarines (Walrus class) are being built to replace the two oldest submarines. Two more will follow soon. In times of war, submarines will be pledged to NATO to be deployed in combating surface ships and submarines and carrying out surveillance, reconnaissance, special operations and the laying of mines.

It goes without saying that submarines are also needed as participants in exercises with escort ships, naval patrol planes and helicopters. But the most important job for submarines in both times of peace and times of crises is "surveillance" and especially continuous training. Submarines, specifically those propelled by conventional means, are hard to find. They cause serious problems to the opponent because they are highly able to react promptly but unexpectedly as far as the opponent is concerned. This is in and of itself an aspect of deterrence.

Navy Patrol Group

Navy patrol planes operate from the Valkenburg navy air base. In times of increasing tension and in times of war they also operate from bases in Great Britain. Through the combination of its speed, flying time and sensors, a navy patrol plane is able to survey large sea areas in a relatively short period of

time, whereas its great range and its armaments are very important for submarine warfare.

Vital to deterrence are: to know where the opponent (under and above water) is located. The navy patrol plane does this in peacetime, crises and naturally also in wartime. In wartime this is naturally followed by the elimination of the opponent. (I only say this to be complete!)

Helicopter Group

In submarine warfare, helicopters form an integrated part of the escort groups. The existing number of 22 standard helicopters of the Lynx type will in time be supplemented up to a number of 30 with helicopters of a still to be determined type.

Mine Service

In order to be able to keep connecting lines in the Channel and in the access routes to the West European harbors free of mines, mine sweepers and mine hunters are needed.

Meanwhile, 5 mine hunters of the Alkmaar class have been built; a total of 15 of these ships will be put into service.

The nature and size of the replacement for the Dokkum class mine sweepers is yet to be determined (currently still 11 units).

A clear shift of the mine threat to deep waters has been observed. This means a future need for larger ships, which can operate for longer periods of time on the seas.

Marine Corps

The Corps consists of a ready and a partially ready amphibious combat group, with a peacetime strength of 2,800 individuals. The amphibious combat groups are very mobile units which can be deployed to defend the flanks of the NATO region on the islands of the Atlantic Ocean.

Specifically, the first amphibious combat group and Whiskey Company are trained and equipped for operations on the northern flank, in close cooperation with the British marines. The trade mark of the marines is: promptly deployable anywhere in the world. This requires, among other things, amphibious landing craft.

Hydrographic Service

The hydrographic service takes care of the hydrographic activities on the Dutch part of the continental shelf in the North Sea. This national task is particularly focussed on support for anti-mine defense, such as working out convoy routes and knowledge about soil movements. There are one oceanographic and two hydrographic vessels.

Peacetime Operations

For all units, peacetime operations are primarily directed toward achieving and maintaining operational readiness.

This requires an intensive training program whereby an effort is made to have each ship train at sea for approximately one-third of the year. A so-called watch ship is continuously at sea. Similar norms are indicated for navy patrol planes, helicopters and the Marine Corps.

In this way one of the main conditions for naval deterrence is also achieved, specifically to display trained and ready units with a credible fighting strength.

Supply Routes over the Atlantic Ocean

It is no secret that deterrence in Europe is based on three pillars:

- Nuclear arms;
- Conventional combat forces which could wage war for only a limited period of time;
- Reinforcement and resupply.

If one of these three pillars is defective or missing, the other two will have to be stronger. In this regard, the role of the NATO naval combat forces lies in the third pillar of the deterrence. (In addition, they of course provide deterrence at sea.)

Without safe supply routes (Sea Lines of Communication, sometimes also abbreviated to SLOC) part of deterrence is lacking.

Consequently, I must respond to the often heard opinion that a future war will be short, with the remark that with the current defense plans I can only imagine this to be true if it means that that war will be lost or that nuclear arms will be promptly put to use.

One should not forget that the essence lies in there not being any war! With that in mind, the naval combat forces contribute directly not only to deterrence at sea but also to deterrence in Central Europe.

This article does not lend itself to a detailed strategic consideration of the distribution of the burden over the three pillars. A subtle balance among the various forms of deterrence requires more than a superficial approach. There are good reasons for this last remark.

Given the fact that the expansion of communism can be carried out successfully only outside Europe (and in Europe certainly not with military means) the dangers are lurking elsewhere. Hence, the tendency of France, the United States and England to recognize their responsibilities elsewhere also. This tendency will lead to an even greater shortage of naval combat forces in the North Atlantic Ocean.

This means that the security of the SLOC's in the North Atlantic Ocean is becoming, to a larger extent, an issue for the North European countries: England, Norway, Denmark, the FRG, Belgium and the Netherlands. It will be necessary for the sake of maintaining deterrence.

Roos on Army

The Hague ONS LEGER in Dutch Apr 84 pp 24-26, 29-30

[Article by Lieutenant General J.G. Roos, commander of the land combat forces: "The Royal Army in the Process of Changing"]

[Text] Introduction

This year, it will have been 40 years since the Royal Dutch Brigade "Princess Irene," the Dutch Commandos and the Domestic Combat Forces, among which the special Assault Troops deserve notice, formed the basis of the new, developing Royal Army [KL]. The developments following the liberation were great, yes even stormy. A number of examples follow.

Development of mission: from being nationally oriented to operating within a NATO context and within the framework of United Nations peace operations. From action including "overseas" action to action in Western Europe. From defense on the Yssel to forward defense in the FRG.

Technical developments: from armed men to manned arms.

At the same time the social developments, especially for a KL of which two-thirds is made up of conscripts, have had a great influence. These are still being felt.

However, it is not my intention to take you along into the history of the Royal Army, but to show you in this article how the KL anticipates the future, and this with the help of plans as they have been set down in the 1984-1993 KL plan. This 10 year plan forms the basis for the KL contribution in the 1984 Defense Memorandum. In drawing up this plan, attempts were made within the given possibilities to obtain a balanced, structured organization with which maximum fighting strength is achieved. This also ensures that the KL will be up to its task in the years to come.

In the January issue of this paper, in the article "The Royal Army and the Memorandum," a great deal of attention was already given to the plans for the KL. In this article a number of elements will be further explained. We will also consider the why of the changes and adjustments and indicate the connection between them.

Elements from the Plan

The Royal Army can be subdivided in various ways. One approach, for example, is a division by identifiable tasks in the areas of command, such as the First Army Corps in the allied context in the FRG, and the National Territorial

Command for the security of the territory of the Netherlands. Another approach was chosen for this article: focussing on the task areas distinguishable within the areas of command: maneuver, fire support, military engineering, logistics, etcetera.

Maneuver

The combat strength of the First Army Corps is formed by 10 brigades, and specifically by the maneuver battalions of these brigades, the (armored) infantry battalions and the tank battalions.

There is need for improvement in a number of areas. The KL plan provides measures for the army corps in the area of armored combat, of capacity for action in urban and forested areas, of the safeguarding of the rear area of the army corps, of action under conditions of reduced visibility, and of improvement of the reaction time necessary for the movement and deployment of the army corps in war formations.

For modern armored combat a system is necessary as well as anti-tank weapons and tanks. The possibility to quickly deploy tank obstacles is also a requirement. Armored combat helicopters are also desirable for a balanced armored combat capability, because this makes it possible to respond quickly and adequately to a sudden threat. However the purchase of armored combat helicopters will not be possible in the short term and is expected to take place only in the early nineties. Consideration is being given, however, to arming light helicopters in the relatively short term with a number of anti-tank missiles. For the moment priority is given to earth bound systems.

Following the current modernization of the Leopard I tanks and the inflow of the modern Leopard II's, the Royal Army will have at its disposal a whole tank park specific to its task. Through reorganization, the number of tanks in the tank battalions of the armored infantry brigades is being increased. However the capacity of the long range anti-tank weapons will improve. The number of these weapons systems in the armored infantry battalions of the armored infantry brigades will go up by 25 percent. The armored anti-tank companies of the armored infantry brigades are disappearing and the armored combat equipment of these units is being redistributed among the above mentioned armored infantry battalions. Thus the anti-tank capacity of the army corps will be more modern, better organized and better suited to its task.

Because of the ever increasing development and forestation within the army corps's area of operation, a greater need has developed for units which are better suited to operate in those areas, specifically infantry units. To this effect, an extra mobilizable infantry battalion has been incorporated into the organization of the army corps.

In addition to the 9 mechanized brigades, the army corps commander has 101 infantry brigades at his disposal. The resources of this currently non-mechanized brigade are inadequate. Two infantry battalions of this brigade will be mechanized. The remaining infantry battalions of the army corps will be very much improved in terms of equipment through the incorporation of extra mortars, anti-tank systems and organic means of transportation. Furthermore, four reconnaissance battalions will be available, two more than is the case now. The resources to form these two extra reconnaissance battalions have become available through the removal of the reconnaissance squadrons from the brigades, which will now receive reconnaissance platoons.

Warsaw Pact combat forces have the ability to take action under conditions of reduced visibility (darkness, fog). Therefore, it must be possible to conduct defense 24 hours a day (around the clock) effectively. This will be achieved by introducing, in addition to the existing night vision equipment, such as clarity enhancers, modern thermal imagery devices. This equipment will be built into the Leopard II tanks and will also be ordered shortly for the Leopard I tanks, the TOW [wire guided] anti-tank weapons and some of the armored infantry combat vehicles YPR-765.

Because the majority of the army corps units are based in the Netherlands and because in addition about two-thirds of the servicemen are not ready, measures are necessary to ensure that the army corps will be able to take its defensive positions on time in the area of operation. Operationally it would naturally be preferable to base the whole First Army Corps or a fully ready division in the FRG. However this is prohibitive. Even to base a second fully ready brigade would far exceed our financial capacity. This would be done at the expense of vital investments and/or of operations. In that case, much needed purchases could not be made; substantial adjustments in the size of the KL would even be necessary. All of that would reduce the overall fighting power. More cost effective solutions are being sought. Measures to reduce the reaction time of the army corps have been discussed in previous articles. I will only mention here the purchase of more railroad flat cars which could quickly transport the heavy tracked vehicles to Germany.

In the national sector, two territorial brigades, with four battalions each, plus three security battalions and one commando troop battalion and a large number of security companies are available to protect the territory. The National Reserve Corps, which consists of volunteers, fulfills an ever more important role in the national sector.

The role played by our country in the transit of allied units and supplies for our allies gives growing importance to the protection of objects and roads which are important for supply and transportation. This protection will also be needed at an early stage in connection with the mobilization and transfer of the army corps. However, the majority of the mobilizable units of the National Territorial Command will become available only at a late stage in the mobilization. Therefore provision has been made for a strong expansion of the National Reserve Corps (50 percent), in part to replace a number of mobilizable security units. Given its nature, this Corps would be available at an early stage and, due to the excellent motivation and training of the volunteers

and their knowledge of local conditions, it would be excellently suited to such tasks.

Fire Support

The most important elements of the fire support are the guns (artillery and mortars) and missiles, the target detection equipment, the combat direction and fire control equipment, and the ammunition. Within the army corps, every (armored) infantry battalion has mortars and every brigade has its own field artillery division for immediate fire support to the maneuver units. Furthermore, a number of field artillery divisions are available at the level of the army corps. The obsolete French mechanized guns of the AMX 105 millimeter type have recently been completely replaced with modern American 155 millimeter M109 guns. Moreover, the 8 inch towed Howitzers which have been in the organization for about 30 years already, have been replaced by mechanized guns of the same caliber of the M110 type. This has considerably improved the weight, the deployment possibilities and the effects.

It is currently necessary to do something about the obsolete 155 millimeter towed guns of the seven mobilizable divisions (M114). The most important effects of the planned modernization are: a much greater weight and the ability to fire modern ammunition. Furthermore, automatic fire control is being introduced. The joint effectiveness of four modernized divisions is greater than that of the seven obsolete ones. From the point of view of cost effectiveness it has been decided thus to modernize four of the above mentioned divisions and to eliminate the remaining three divisions. On balance an important improvement is achieved this way.

Great importance must be attached to combating enemy artillery and mortars (anti-ground weapon systems). The tackling of enemy units also requires more in-depth attention. This makes high demands on target detection equipment, on aim and fire direction. In order to meet this need, in addition to the above mentioned modernization of guns, a new mortar detection radar has been purchased and a development order has been placed with Dutch industry (Holland Signaal) for an automatic fire direction system. Meanwhile, a modern noise measuring system has become operational. The target detection equipment will be expanded in the long term, with the purchase of artillery detection radar.

At the same time, provision has been made for purchase in the late eighties of a multiple missile launch system with great fire power and great range.

Priority has been given to bringing the supplies of ammunition to a normal level. Furthermore, improvement of the effects, specifically against hard targets, is necessary. Therefore modern ammunition which meets these requirements is being purchased. In addition, there will be mine systems which can be detonated, which will also limit enemy movements in depth and with which sudden enemy penetrations or flank threats can be quickly cut off.

The modernization of fire support requires substantial investments. Hence, it was unfortunately necessary to make room for this in the area of operation by making a single ready division of mechanized field artillery (M109) mobilizable. However, this is off-set by important improvements.

Air Defense

Air defense takes place within the framework of the integrated NATO anti-aircraft system and for the territory of the Netherlands as a whole it has been entrusted to the air combat forces. The KL provides for air defense of the army corps through area defense and self-defense of units and installations. For this task, a combination of guns and guided weapons systems and an integrated combat direction and warning system, which ties in with the NATO air defense system, is indispensable.

The KL has the gun systems in the form of modern armored 35 millimeter rapid fire guns, divided among three divisions of armored anti-aircraft artillery. The 40L70 gun system has become obsolete primarily because of the associated radar and its effectiveness is small in relation to the operating costs. Hence this system is being taken out of the organization.

In terms of guided weapons systems, the portable Stinger-Basic has been purchased, the introduction of which in the armored anti-aircraft artillery divisions will start next year.

Funds have been set aside for the medium term improvement of, among other things, combat direction and warning systems as well as for the further expansion of guided weapons and gun systems.

Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Aspects

Protection against the consequences of the use of nuclear, biological and/or chemical (NBC) weapons is broken down into warning and detection, individual protection, the protection of equipment (for example, supplies in vehicles and command posts) and decontamination. The purchase of equipment for NBC protection is a high priority. Measures are being taken in all areas to improve the degree of protection. The key point lies in the first instance in improving individual protection (clothing, gloves, shoes, gas masks).

Electronic Warfare

It is of great importance that the Royal Army has means at its disposal for use in electronic warfare [EOV]. As a matter of fact, an ever increasing number of weapons systems is dependent on electromagnetic radiation for effective deployment (radar, communications).

This EOV equipment serves:

- to provide protection against enemy attempts to hamper the use of electronic equipment;
- to hinder the enemy in the use of its electronic equipment;
- to obtain information about the enemy.

During the recently conducted army corps exercises "Atlantic Lion," with the help of an American EOV unit experience was obtained for the first time on a large scale in the use of equipment for electronic warfare. This also demonstrated that a quick purchase of EOV equipment is advisable. However, given

the rapidly developing technology in this area and the relative lack of familiarity in the Royal Army with this complicated equipment, its introduction will have to take place in stages. They will start with the acquisition of capability for the forward divisions of the army corps.

Command, Communications and Combat Direction

The great mobility on the combat field has led to increasingly shorter reaction times. This means that relevant information should be very quickly at the disposal of a commander and his staff in order to achieve the correct decisions and command. Timely anticipation requires the ability to "look" ever deeper into enemy territory. Furthermore, one must be sure that instructions reach the level of implementation in a quick and reliable manner.

To this effect, the army corps now has an army corps communications system at its disposal, consisting of beam senders, and network radios for lower level communication. Furthermore, in wartime the army corps also has command, communications and combat direction over a light aircraft group, equipped with helicopters of the Alouette III and the BO-105 type. Improvements have been planned in this area:

- improvement of the command system of the First Army Corps through support of data transmission, decision making and command. The core of this project, known by its abbreviation VERCOS (improvement command system), is the introduction of technical command aids;
- further automation of the army corps communications system;
- replacement of network radios;
- replacement of the Alouette III helicopters;
- purchase of combat information and target detection devices, with which one can look deeper into enemy territory. In this context they are thinking, among other things, about drones (small airplanes which can be guided from a distance).

Engineering Corps

For engineering support, the army commander has two combat engineer groups at his disposal, consisting of a number of engineer battalions and support units (among others, with construction machinery and bridge building capability). In addition, every brigade has its own armored engineer company.

The National Territorial Commander has a combat engineer group at his disposal, which plays an important role especially in maintaining the supply and transportation routes.

As has become clear from the above, for the moment the army corps needs equipment with which to quickly lay obstacles within the framework of armored vehicle combat. This year, part of this need will be met through the introduction of a mechanical system for laying mines, while there are also plans to purchase area mines (the so-called horizontal effect mines) and mines which can be detonated and scattered. The army corps bridge building capability has been improved with the purchase of folding bridges of the "Ribbon bridge" type. The

thus released pontoon sheet bridges will be transferred to the National Territorial Commander. Thus the bridge building capability of the national sector is also improved.

Logistics

Logistic support consists to an important degree of maintenance and supply.

To keep the deployability of the equipment at a normal level, good maintenance is necessary. This requires an adequate maintenance system, expert personnel and the availability of enough spare parts. Extra funds have been set aside for the improvement of deployability. Due to the ever more complicated and more modern equipment, the current maintenance system is no longer fully adequate. Hence, a start has been made in the shift to another maintenance method, whereby the weapons system as a whole is stressed more than it is now. Supply is to a large degree dependent on possibilities of distribution. This includes, among other things, transportation and transshipment capabilities. The system of gasoline, diesel oil and ammunition supply is being improved. The labor intensive and thus time consuming use of jerrycans has largely been replaced by bulk supply at the vehicle which needs the fuel. At the same time, a new ammunition supply system is being introduced, based on ammunition on pallets. This means, among other things, the introduction of a lifting capability in the form of fork lift trucks and new transportation equipment, such as 10 ton trucks. The replacement of obsolete wheel vehicles, which has been going on for quite some time, is continuing steadily. There is also an increasing need for transportation capability by air. The purchase of transport helicopters is being planned for the early nineties.

Personnel Policy

In the above, changes have been outlined which have already taken place in terms of organization and resources, and which will be continued in the coming years. Personnel still forms the most essential element of the armed forces, and the quality of this personnel to a large extent determines the effectiveness of the units.

In the personnel area, constant efforts are made for renewal and improvement. This takes place in a process of gradual changes with a great deal of attention to the necessary continuity. This continuity is characteristic of a balanced personnel structure, which keeps personnel from being suddenly faced with vital changes and which gives substantial opportunity for input and dialogue, as is currently customary.

In recent years improvements have been implemented in many parts of the personnel policy. However, much remains to be done. Numerous initiatives have been started and planned to continue the line of improvements. In this context, one could name, among other things: job filling, the training system, adjustments in the personnel structure and in the set of functions, changes in general and individual careers, review of the distribution of the non-commissioned officer categories and the setting of their tasks.

Given the great importance of the developments in the area of personnel for the Royal Army as a whole, in addition to the Personnel Director, the Army Council is virtually always involved. The methodical and energetic approach of the many parts of the personnel policy which can still be improved, does justice to the personnel, which with good motivation and a great deal of drive, makes an effort for this far from always simple task and offers good prospects for the future.

Conclusion

The 1984 Defense Memorandum was given the theme of continuity and renewal. Continuity because of the maintenance of the tasks. Renewal is expressed, among other things, in the replacement of old and the supplementing of existing weapons systems, in addition to the adjustment of the organization. Some insight has been given in the above about changes which have been planned by the KL for the coming years.

There will always be wishes, if only because of the rapidly advancing technological developments and the nature of the threat. However, the implementation of these plans will produce a modern equipped and effectively organized KL. Moreover, the devotion and expertise of the personnel guarantee that our land combat forces will be equal to their task. It is to be hoped that the "spirit" of 1944 and the devotion of today will ring through in the years ahead of us.

Baas on Air Force

The Hague ONS LEGER in Dutch Apr 84 pp 32-35

[Article by Lieutenant General C. Baas, commander of the air combat forces: "The Royal Air Force in the Netherlands and in NATO"]

[Text] Introduction

Seen from the point of view of defense, 1984 is a special year. As a matter of fact it was 40 years ago that the allied invasion sounded the end of Nazi domination in Europe and brought the recovery of freedom closer; it must be noted now that to maintain that freedom it is still necessary to maintain efficient and, especially, credible armed forces. The 1984 Defense Memorandum shows in what way the Netherlands has given content, and will in the future, to its defense efforts. As commander of the air combat forces I will of course give attention to the place of the Royal Air Force in this effort. But before doing that, I will first say a few words about the threat, not an unusual thing in military circles.

Two important events have taken place on the side of the Warsaw Pact: the large scale introduction of ground to air guided weapons for air defense and the introduction of combat helicopters for direct support to their own ground combat forces. As a result, airplanes which were originally intended for one of the two tasks have become available for other tasks, which has meant a significant strengthening of the tactical offensive potential and specifically an increase of the threat against the rear areas of NATO. In addition, the

technological developments have also produced the expected qualitative improvements on the side of the Warsaw Pact. Both the weapon capacity and the action radius have become ever greater. In addition, there is the fact that the rate of airplane replacement is relatively high.

The NATO response to the development outlined above was: modernization and at least a one on one replacement of obsolete weapons systems. This is a requirement, at least if the tactical air combat forces in Europe want to continue adequately to carry out the tasks given to them, that is to say protection of our own area (air defense) and offensive action against the enemy air power potential and ground combat forces (tactical operations). Within the context of the alliance the Netherlands, in this case the Royal Air Force, makes a contribution to both tasks and, in this respect, it certainly does not look bad.

Air Defense

The most important task of the air defense organization in peace time is the continuous guarding of the air space. Day and night the air is scanned by a chain of radar stations in Western Europe in order to identify and follow all airplanes flying in it. This guarding naturally stretches beyond the borders of one's own territory; as a matter of fact, that is precisely where it is important to know what is going on in the air. Unfortunately, because of the curving of the earth this is possible at low altitudes only to limited depths. This is why, within the framework of NATO, the so-called NATO Airborne Early Warning Force [NAEW] was established, which is capable, with the aid of Boeing E 3A-planes, of observing all air movement down to a level close to the surface and far into foreign territory.

Guarding without the possibility of actual action makes less sense. Therefore airplanes and surface to air guided missiles are available for the actual air defense. Each one of those arms systems has specific characteristics with advantages and disadvantages, and they complement each other as it were. If, for example, identification through ground radar is impossible, airplanes -- which are on the alert at all times -- could go investigate on the spot. This so-called air policing mission is led from the ground, and in peacetime it is bound by the "Rules of Engagement." Armed intervention is allowed only if the trespasser himself takes actual combat action. Guided weapons [GW] are by their very nature unfit for such a mission, but on the other hand they have the advantage that they can be maintained at a rather high level of readiness for very long periods of time. With relatively little effort. This is why in Central Europe these systems -- located in a guided missile belt as close as possible along the eastern border of the FRG -- are permanently ready to be activated within a very short period of time. The lessons of Pearl Harbor have been learned.

The Royal Air Force makes a contribution to all the components mentioned. The policing of the air space has been entrusted to the Control and Report Center at Nieuw Milligen, as this radar station is officially called. In addition to its own radar this station is provided with information from the Radar Post North in Friesland, the other stations of the NATO radar chain in Europe and

the NAEW planes. The F-16 squadrons of the Leeuwarden air base take care of the air policing task, as a matter of fact together with the American squadron at Soesterberg, and two Hawk groups and now also a Nike group which are part of the so-called "SAM [Surface to Air Missile]" belt in the FRG. As is known, during the second half of the eighties the Nike will be replaced by the super-modern Patriot system. The NAEW Force will be strengthened in terms of personnel. All units involved in the air defense are characterized by constantly maintaining a high level of readiness which furthermore can be increased even more within a few hours.

As far as the integrated GW belt is concerned, two more aspects must be mentioned. This involves first of all the great psychological and thus political importance to be attached to the physical presence and readiness of NATO air combat forces in the FRG. This not only demonstrates allied solidarity to a potential aggressor but also to the people of the FRG. The other aspect is purely operational in character. Because of its forward location, the belt provides not only protection to the rear areas but it also contributes to fighting air dominance beyond one's own forward deployed ground combat forces. And thus also to the other task of the tactical air combat forces: offensive operations.

Offensive Operations

Support for one's own ground combat forces is the traditional role of tactical air combat forces. In the forefront in this regard is trying to obtain air superiority in order to give one's own troops freedom of action. This air superiority can be fought by attacking airplanes in the air but also by attacking airfields and airplanes on the ground. In addition, ground combat forces which are in imminent danger of being driven to the wall can also be supported through one's own air combat forces carrying out raids against enemy troops. This could take several forms, such as the so-called Close Air Support Missions at the front or Interdiction Missions more toward the rear, whereby the enemy's Follow-on-Forces are put under pressure, in this case isolated from the front area. Finally, carrying out air reconnaissance must be mentioned as a task for the tactical air combat forces. These missions can be carried out for the benefit of ground combat forces as well as air combat forces.

The above task description will not include any new elements for the majority of the readers. It may perhaps be more interesting to look for a moment at the types of airplanes which have played a role in this respect. Fighters were necessary for the air defense task and for waging air battles; for attacking targets on the ground light bombers or fighter bombers were used. Hence, different planes were used for different missions. With the advent of the F-104G, however, the Royal Air Force switched to two variants of the same type. In addition to the arms, the difference was evident primarily in the on board equipment. As a matter of fact, from an operational point of view there were a number of objections to the Starfighter. The limited ability to maneuver and to carry arms made this plane into a very humble fighter bomber, at least with conventional arms.

With the F-16, however, an enormous step forward has been made. The plane's ability to maneuver is great and the on board equipment is suitable for carrying out all kinds of offensive and defensive missions. Only the external arms and the corresponding suspension points will need to be changed in case of a role change. In spite of the limitations also inherent to the F-16, this advanced airplane has led us into a phase whereby the man in the loop seems to have become the limiting factor, both physically in terms of g-forces and mentally in terms of the large number of possibilities of the on board systems. It is a situation which we have in fact never experienced before and the consequences of which we may not yet be able to grasp fully.

As a matter of fact, the choice of the F-16 was partly based on the task specializations agreed upon within NATO context. Within the framework of this specialization, the air defense role is left, under all circumstances, in the hands of the F-15's of the American air force. Long distance offensive missions will be carried out by specialized airplanes from other -- larger -- air forces. For a relatively small organization such as our air force, financial margins require a choice for optimal solutions, maximum value for the money or more bang for the buck. In many cases it means that the top of the operational spectrum can be reached because a relatively high price has to be paid precisely for that extreme capacity. However, as long as the large majority of enemy operations must take place during the day and in any case under reasonably good weather conditions, the limitations of the F-16 are fully acceptable and this airplane is very well suited for the offensive and defensive tasks which have been allocated.

Command Structure

Tactical airplanes are characterized by mobility and flexibility. They offer the capacity to quickly concentrate a substantial combat force at a great distance from their base. They can act against both air and ground targets, in widely divergent locations spread over a relatively large area. In this respect, guided weapons cannot be compared with airplanes but the heavier systems, specifically the Patriot, have in any case an action radius which reaches beyond the national borders. The same applies to the radar systems of the reporting stations and the combat direction stations.

It goes without saying that because of this, a national approach by organizations in Europe and a putting into service of air combat forces would lead to a not very effective and certainly a not very efficient use of resources. This has of course been recognized in the past, so that the operational command over the majority of the operational Royal Air Force units has been transferred already in peacetime to the NATO commanders. All air combat forces in the Central Sector have been placed under the operational command of a single umbrella headquarters, specifically the Allied Air Forces Central Europe [AAFCE]. The headquarters of the Second and Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force have been placed under the AAFCE. These tactical air forces are linked respectively to the Northern and Central Army Groups. The task of these "links" is to protect and defend the area allocated to them. The Royal Army and the Royal Air Force contribute their share respectively to the Northern Army Group and 2 ATAF.

The total available combat strength is maintained at the operational headquarters of 2 ATAF; based on the available combat information, the tasks are allocated to the branches via the ATOC (for offensive missions) and the SOC (for defensive operations). If a special area has been allocated to ILK for defense purposes, the airplanes of the Royal Air Force can be deployed over the whole area of the central Sector, even though the emphasis will obviously be placed on the 2 ATAF area.

Special Tasks

The NATO strategy is directed toward maintaining peace through the maintenance of a credible deterrent potential against possible aggressors. This deterrence is built out of elements which together form a trinity, specifically strategic-nuclear, tactical-nuclear and conventional arms systems. The Royal Air Force contributes to this with airplanes which can be used both as nuclear and as conventional systems.

A number of existing units of ground and air combat forces in the Allied Command Europe [ACE] are part of the so-called ACE Mobile Forces [AMF]. They have a kind of fire department function and serve a double goal: to strengthen the local armed forces but especially to demonstrate mutual solidarity. The Netherlands participates in the AMF (Air) with a Royal Air Force squadron whose primary area of operation is Norway and Denmark.

I cannot fail to mention the special form of cooperation between the Royal Air Force and the other two branches of the armed forces. The Royal Air Force operates the Light Aircraft Group for the benefit of the Royal Army, with Alouette III and Bolkow 105C helicopters. The squadrons are stationed at the Soesterberg and Deelen air bases, but in wartime they are assigned to the First Army Corps. There is also very specific cooperation with the Royal Navy. In an integrated context, the Royal Air Force in the Netherlands Antilles flies 2F-27M airplanes. Finally, it is common knowledge that the Royal Air Force provides support to the government in the form of air transportation.

Conclusion

In the above, an attempt has been made to draw a picture of the tasks allocated to the Royal Air Force with the assumption that plans in the area of personnel and equipment are known well enough as a result of the publication of the 1984 Defense Memorandum.

Therefore it seemed to make more sense to place somewhat greater emphasis here on the manner of operation or, to use NATO terminology, on the concept of operations. However, it goes without saying that the means available to that end are vital elements for the fulfilling of those tasks. I consider myself lucky to have been assured that in a number of years the Royal Air Force will consist dominantly of about three modern weapons systems, specifically the Improved Hawk, the F-16 and the Patriot. With those, the Netherlands will be able to remain at the front of the row of smaller NATO countries.

JORGENSEN'S GRADUAL MOVE TO LEFT ON SECURITY POLICY TRACED

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4-10 May 84 pp 1, 12

/Commentary by John Wagner: "Anker Jorgensen's Long Peace March"/

/Text/ The Social Democratic Party chairman has the support of Ritt Bjerregaard, and Lasse Budtz does what he is asked to do. Svend Auken, Svend Jakobsen and Knud Heinesen, however, have begun to renege and make changes in Anker Jorgensen's security policy agenda proposals. WEEKENDAVISEN has studied who and what do influence the former prime minister's more than 16-year long effort to get a different security policy.

It was 6 o'clock in the morning. The sun was shining from a virtually cloudless sky and the birds were singing. It was Tuesday, 1 May--the international day of struggle for labor and the day Tivoli opened.

Some 70 to 80 Social Democrats were standing on Bispebjerg Hill outside the cultural center waiting for party chairman Anker Jorgensen. And he kept them waiting. They were singing "Rise up ye damned here on earth" with the refrain, which starts out "Wake up from your apathy and fight," but Jorgensen had overslept. Members of Social Democratic Youth rolled up the red banner and everybody went inside where it was warm for coffee and hard rolls. Jorgensen finally arrived 20 minutes late and they all applauded.

Jorgensen swallowed a cup of coffee, walked over to the far wall which was decorated with red banners and apologized for being late. He talked urgently about solidarity, social understanding and struck a new blow for peace.

"There is a risk that the entire world will come to grief. Therefore, we must stop the nuclear arms race. We do say yes to defense and yes to NATO. But we are honestly concerned about pursuing matters to the point where the population becomes bewitched by the arms race. This could end in the suicide of mankind," warned Jorgensen and explained precisely why he wants NATO to scrap the new nuclear missiles. Now.

Jorgensen's peace march has been a long one. Experienced politicians can recall--he himself does not remember it too clearly--that 16 years ago Jorgensen broke

with the Social Democratic Party discipline and halfway agreed with proposals submitted by the Socialist People's Party /SF/ and the Socialist Left Party /VS/ regarding defense cuts and disarmament.

This was 19 March 1968. Jens Otto Krag, Per Hakkerup and Victor Gram had addressed an inquiry to Minister of Defense Erik Ninn-Hansen, Conservative Party /KF/, about the defense budgets. Morten Lange (SF) submitted a proposal whereby the Social Democratic Party /S/, the Liberal Party /V/ and KF were to "terminate the defense agreement" and the government "was to effect a general disarmament of Denmark." Sv. E. Kjar Rasmussen (VS) proposed that Parliament ask for "progressively larger and permanent military budget cuts."

Of course, the two proposals were rejected by the Liberal and the Christian People's parties as well as the Social Democratic Party. But many observed that Anker Jorgensen, the then chairman of the Danish Workers and Skilled Workers Union, now SiD, acted independently and abstained from voting.

It has always been like this. One of Jorgensen's older fellow party members expressed it this way:

"Anker has always been a little ahead and a little more to the left than the rest of us. He fears the conservative forces in the United States, especially Reagan, just as much as others of us worry about communist world control, and he becomes very upset when he hears about nuclear arms."

Minister of Justice Erik Ninn-Hansen, who has closely followed the Jorgensen development, said:

"The Social Democratic Party's turn to the left following the change of government was expected. This has always been the case when S is in opposition. And if we look back to see what Anker stood for during the sixties, it is not surprising that he is now giving us a great deal of trouble in the security-policy area."

Jorgensen himself said:

"I have never been a pacifist. I have always felt that we should have a defense system. Naturally, we shall fight for our freedom. Of course, we shall remain a NATO member. But this does not mean that we have to go to the opposite extreme and accept nuclear arms and all of Reagan's new strategies."

Jorgensen admitted that feelings and perceptions greatly influence his position. When asked whether he consults professors, government officials or other so-called experts before airing his opinions, he answered:

"Expert knowledge does not have a patent on the right answers. So far, I have gotten sufficiently qualified support and opposition from my party advisers."

Daily Leadership

Jorgensen's advisers are part of the party's "daily leadership," comprising first of all political spokesman Svend Auken and Deputy Chairman Ritt Bjerregaard. Also normally included are Social Democratic parliamentary group chairman Svend Jakobsen, former Minister of Finance Knud Heinesen, former Minister of Economic Affairs Ivar Norgaard and parliamentary group secretary Jytte Andersen.

The moving force, however, is Anker Jorgensen. He is supported by Ritt Bjerregaard, who is now also interested in security policy, and the loyal Jytte Andersen. It is said that Bjerregaard "wields considerable influence because Anker does not dare to have another quarrel with Ritt."

The powerful trip--Auken, Jakobsen and Heinesen--exert a moderating influence on Jorgensen. It may be surprising that Auken--the EC opponent--attaches so much importance to restoring security-policy agreement between his party and the government. But this he does. Ivar Norgaard can be placed somewhat to the left--but, moreover, he concentrates on embarrassing Minister of Foreign Affairs Uffe Ellemann-Jensen.

When security policy is debated by the daily leadership, foreign policy spokesman Lasse Budtz is summoned. It is a widespread misunderstanding, however, that his position is supposed to be to the left of Jorgensen and that it is he who inspires the chairman. "Lasse Budtz does what he is asked to do," said a fellow party member, describing Budtz as "a department head."

Defense-policy spokesman Knud Damgaard--whose loyal hope is to become minister--and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Kjeld Olesen also become involved in the decisionmaking process early. And, with respect to Olesen's position, it is said he is concerned about the development, but lacks the energy to fight it.

If there is enough time and the matter is very important, all Social Democrats on the Foreign Policy Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Defense Committee are summoned--including Karl Jhortnas, Jens Risgaard Knudsen, Poul Sogaard and Robert Pedersen, the only person to outwardly oppose the leadership's security-policy adjustment. Then the group meeting begins.

There is disagreement about who is trying to pull the daily leadership in one direction or the other. It can be said with certainty that Helle Degn, Jytte Hilden, Ole Espersen and Karl Jhortnas are pulling to the left, while Robert Pedersen, Poul Sogaard, Egon Jensen, Risgaard Knudsen and, lately, Mogens Camre too are pulling in the opposite direction. Many feel they can live with agendas that are also acceptable to the government. Other "nonsocialist" Social Democrats, like former Minister Erling Jense, do not say anything at all.

The leadership held many and long meetings regarding Jorgensen's proposed agenda prior to the question-and-answer debate the day before yesterday when the Social Democrats got a number of "adjustments" put together. Already last Thursday, Jorgensen sketched a proposal for Lasse Budtz, who worked out the first draft. It was rejected by an expanded daily leadership, which Auken, Jakobsen and Heinesen were said to have had "considerable reservations." A second draft

also underwent many changes before a third draft--after some fine-polishing--was sent down to the group for extensive debate Wednesday morning. Some 10 group members had objections until further changes were made, after which only Robert Pedersen objected to it.

WEEKENDAVISEN has learned that the Social Democratic Party leadership this time--contrary to earlier practice--was in contact with the government during the early stages of the decisionmaking process.

As we already mentioned, Jorgensen does rely much on expert advice, but a single fellow party member outside the group, the party's international secretary Steen Christensen, does influence the chairman's position. Together with Budtz, Christensen writes most of Jorgensen's foreign policy speeches and supplies him with sundry notes. Steen Christensen, 38 years old, has an MA in social science and he taught at Esbjerg College prior to becoming a party official.

Although Jorgensen can be "boorishly stubborn," his closest advisers feel they can influence him. Government officials, who advised him when he was prime minister, say the same thing. However, developments also show that Jorgensen has a deeper respect for the opposition wielded by the expert knowledge of cabinet ministers than that of political protesters, like Robert Pedersen, for example. A government official expressed it this way:

"Anker quickly became aware that the yoke of responsibility is heavy and binding. But it was difficult for him to abstain from saying what he meant."

8952

CSO: 3613/163

FORMER MP: POLITICAL PARTY STRUCTURE WILL BE SAME IN 1990

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Mar 84 p 12

[Article by Uffe Thorndahl, former MP (Progressive Party)]

[Text] A total of 13 parties participated in the parliamentary elections on 10 January, but only nine of these reached the 2-percent threshold for representation in parliament.

For generations, Danish politics has been dominated by the four old parties: the Social Democrats, the Conservatives, the Liberals, and the Radical Liberals. But this pattern was broken by the landslide election of 12 April 1973, in which the number of parties in parliament increased to ten.

It has become clear in recent years, however, that the voters are rallying more and more behind the old parties. Thus, it could be interesting to predict which parties will gain representation in parliament in 1990 and how strong these parties will be. It is clear that the number of parties in 1990 will be lower than today and it is highly probable that the three small parties we now have in parliament--the Progressive Party, the Christian People's Party, and the Left-Socialist Party--will be out of parliament at that time.

Explanations are hardly necessary for the Progressive Party. With regard to the Christian People's Party, since the elections of 15 February 1977, it has had difficulty staying above the threshold and in each election it has taken a great effort to keep the party above 2 percent.

This simply cannot continue and most of the party's voters will keep voting for the Liberal Party.

The Left Socialists always have been a small party but, especially because of the unbelievable skill and talent of Preben Wilhjelm, they have managed to survive. Now, however, Wilhjelm has resigned from parliament and within 1 or 2 years this will have an effect on voter support. By 1990 most of the party's voters will have been absorbed by the Socialist People's Party.

Of the six remaining parties, only the Center Democrats are in doubt. The decisive question is whether or not Culture Minister Mimi Stilling Jakobsen

will be capable of assuming leadership of the party, succeeding Erhard Jakobsen. It appears, however, that Mimi Stilling Jakobsen has the necessary qualities. In addition, most of those now voting for the Progressive Party will probably end up voting for the Center Democrats, because these "hard core" holdouts simply cannot make themselves vote for one of the "old parties" and by 1990 the only remaining choice will be between staying at home and voting for the Center Democrats.

If we now try to predict the distribution of seat in parliament among the various parties in 1990, we have every reason to believe that the socialist parties will continue to hold slightly fewer seats than the nonsocialist parties.

We can also assume that the Radical Liberals will be supported by 5 to 6 percent of the voters. This seems to be almost a law of nature in the Danish democracy--and we might as well get used to it--although it may be difficult for some people.

The Liberal Party will hardly become larger than it is today. Poul Hartling had an historic opportunity to establish the Liberals in the cities and compete seriously with the Conservative Party. But Poul Hartling shirked his historic responsibility when he called for new parliamentary elections on 9 January 1975. The Liberal Party has definitely lost ground to the Conservative Party and will never be a major party again, despite the many skillful Liberal Party ministers we have had.

The Social Democrats will not overcome their internal crisis. There also will be a leadership crisis by 1990 and support for the party will decline slightly during the remainder of the eighties.

Thus, the six parties will have approximately the following number of seats in 1990:

Social Democrats 50 seats.

Radical Liberals 10 seats.

Conservatives 50 seats.

Socialist People's Party 30 seats.

Center Democrats 10 seats.

Liberals 25 seats.

Thus, we will have two large parties (the Social Democrats and the Conservatives) and two medium-size parties (the Socialist People's Party and the Liberals).

Finally, there will be two small parties: the Radical Liberal Party and the Center Democrats.

It will continue to be the Radicals who will decide whether we will have a Social Democratic or a nonsocialist prime minister so that much, indeed, will remain the same in Danish politics.

9336

CS0: 3613/117

HESSE MINISTER URGES ISLAMIC INSTRUCTION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 21 May 84 p 8

[Article by P.S.: "Should Islamic Religious Instruction be Provided in the Schools?"]

[Text] Naurod, 20 May--In the opinion of Hesse Minister of Culture and Education and Church Affairs Krollmann, the state "should do everything within its power to offer Muslim students in our country religious instruction in their faith." At a meeting of the Catholic Rabanus-Maurus-Academy and the Protestant Academy Arnoldshain in Wiesbaden-Maurod, Krollmann dealt with the issue "Islamic religious instruction in Hesse schools?" from the viewpoint of a state which is neutral in matters of religion.

Krollmann said that the state recognizes the importance of religious-philosophical instruction and education for the peaceful coexistence of peoples, because this constitutes a part of the development and fulfillment of human life. The state, he continued, is "vitally interested in seeing the students learn through their religious instruction to approach ethical questions, which have an impact on their lives and on human coexistence, from the standpoint of their faith." This is the reason why in Hesse religious instruction, or, as a substitute, courses in ethics, are required by law.

The minister stated that in the FRG in 1982, 446,000 Turkish children and adolescents attended public schools. In Hesse, 34,500 children of the Moslem faith attended schools during the school year 1982/83. In March 1983 the conference of ministers of public worship and education had on its agenda the question of introducing Islamic religious instruction, which until now has not been offered in public schools of any of the Federal Laender; nobody had any ideas as to whether or when realistic possibilities for its introduction could be created.

Krollmann also discussed the difficulties of introducing Islamic religious instruction. He disagreed with the contention that the introduction of Islamic religious instruction into a Christian-Occidental culture would "fly in the face of history;" on the contrary, he maintained, it would affirm the continuity of our liberal history and that we would be well advised to "comply with the tasks imposed upon us by our religious-philosophical pluralism." There would be greater conflicts, he continued, if the Muslims were prevented

from living in accordance with their faith and if they were crowded into a ghetto.

Krollmann is well aware of the reservations against this, such as the incompatibility of--for instance, the situation of the woman in Islam; the system of justice decreed by the Koran, and the death penalty for abandoning the Islamic religious community with the Basic Law of the FRG. Attention must be paid to the pronouncements by experts who "cite evidence to the effect that the Islamic world is capable of assimilating Western juridical concepts."

In addition, he said that a pragmatic and juridical accommodation had been found in both Austria and Belgium. The crux of the matter, he continued, lies in having an entity which could conduct a dialogue with the state, and this would have to be a recognized religious community; it could not be a foreign state. Until the present, Islam in the FRG has not been a unified entity. However, there is a growing tendency toward a legal organization structure. Other problems, he said, arise in connection with the training of religious instructors and educational supervision by the state.

On a constitutional basis, the minister feels that equal treatment for Islam, "one of the three monotheistic world religions," is a must. As is the case for Christian churches, the state would not enter into the content of the religion itself; its interest would be solely in the curriculum, which has not been established to date. Krollmann charged the Christian churches with the responsibility of familiarizing the Muslims with the "rules of the game" and those "value concepts" of our society which they consider to be Christian, and to assist them in accepting and tolerating the tensions which are bound to occur.

9273

CSO: 3620/321

ZAYKOV'S BID FOR CP UNITY ASSESSED

Helsinki Helsingin Sanomat in Finnish 1 May 84 p 8

[Commentary by Janne Virkkunen: "CPSU Reenumerates SKP heresies: Certain Individuals Behind the Difficulties"]

[Text] In discussions last week with Finnish Communist leaders, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) enumerated the heresies it believes exist among SKP moderate leaders. The CPSU did not direct its accusations against any Communist leader by name, merely contenting itself with speaking in general "of certain persons."

The CPSU delegation's official position was published Monday in the chief Communist-People's Democrat organ KANSAN UUTiset. The paper published the CPSU delegation head, Leningrad chairman Lev Zaykov's, closing speech in the discussions between the two parties.

Zaykov's speech expressed CPSU concern that the SKP is threatened with a split and the abandonment of the Marxist-Leninist nature of the party. In connection with this Zaykov pointed to the recent SKP Central Committee meeting at which SKP moderates assumed control over the preparations for the party congress under the leadership of first secretary Arvo Aalto.

Zaykov emphasized that the CPSU does not want to interfere in the SKP's internal affairs. At party delegation meetings the question of SKP unity has, according to him, always been a central issue.

The Leningrad chairman expressed his party's satisfaction with the achievements "the SKP has -- despite the prevailing difficulties -- realized in its political activities, in activating the ideological effort and in unifying the party ranks."

According to him, all this was the result of the implementation of the party line formulated at the SKP's 19th and 1982 special congresses. In connection with this Zaykov laid particular emphasis on the line implemented under the leadership of SKP chairman Jouko Kajanoja.

"No Power Struggle in Progress"

Zaykov rejected claims that the cause of the SKP's problems is a party-internal power struggle. He pointed to SKP congress positions in which it was stated that differences in political ideology constitute the underlying cause of these difficulties.

"Our party has never agreed with the interpretation that what is happening in the SKP is 'a power struggle,' nor has it recognized that Finnish Communists are divided into some sort of 'majority and minority' either," Zaykov said.

He again repeated the old CPSU position that "the prolongation of the internal crisis in the SKP is attributable to certain individuals' political-ideological attitudes and specific actions, not to a power struggle engaged in by 'factions' within the party."

Zaykov sharpened his criticism by saying that, "starting with individual and group views, these persons don't want to be guided by party congress resolutions, nor do they endorse the line developed in them, nor want to comply with these resolutions and they prevent the party from carrying them out."

Ideology and Politics

In the ideological domain, according to Zaykov, these individuals want to revise the principles behind SKP activities. The CPSU feels that these individuals regard Marxist-Leninism as being obsolete, are demanding that some of its principles be revised, belittling the importance of Leninism as the Marxism of our times and disputing, among other things, the necessity of a communist press.

In the domain of politics these individuals, in the opinion of the CPSU, dispute the existence of state-monopoly capitalism in Finland. In connection with this Zaykov again raised the doctrine of historical compromise, which "actually forces the party and the working masses into cooperation with the bourgeoisie."

Organization and Foreign Policy

In the domain of organization Zaykov cited as one of these individuals' sins their attempt to allow the SKP to split in two on the pretext of party reform. They still openly doubt the absolute necessity for a Marxist-Leninist party to exist and propose in its stead a sort of Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL) leftist party that would be located between the Social Democrats and the Communists.

In the domain of foreign policy Zaykov accused them of adopting a conciliatory attitude, on the pretext of Finland's "neutrality," toward statements and actions directed against the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Pact and toward doctrines in terms of which "the superpowers are equally responsible" for international tension.

Zaykov went on, accusing them of attempts to disengage the SKP from the CPSU and the Soviet Union as well as from the other socialist countries. "They defend positions in terms of which it is indispensable to 'react critically' to the existing form of socialism," Zaykov said.

The Leningrad chairman also remarked that "they actively propagate all these doctrinal structures and viewpoints through the People's Democratic press and attempts to implement them have even cropped up."

According to Zaykov, this has produced serious consequences, among which he noted the SKP election defeat in the spring 1983 parliamentary elections.

Zaykov feels that the conclusion reached by the SKP member organizations and rank-and-file members, to wit, that "only the principles of Marxist-Leninist and proletarian internationalism as well as party decisions developed in conformity with them can serve as a foundation for party unity, not a victory won by one 'faction' or another."

"SKP Threatened by Open Crisis"

In Zaykov's opinion, the situation in the SKP is changing into an open crisis in which the party's ranks are being threatened with a split. He urged the SKP "to inform the party on its Marxist-Leninist nature and the position and role that inheres in it in the political life of Finland and to engage in the struggle, not in analyses of the party's internal relations."

Zaykov asserted that the CPSU supports the SKP's efforts in Finland and refuted claims that the CPSU meddles in Finnish Communist affairs. "Unfortunately, we must note that some executive members of the SKP and Communists serving in the ADL stick to such claims," Zaykov said.

He noted that the CPSU had published its own position on this in two Soviet newspapers, since the statements in question are in the final analysis directed against Finland's foreign policy line.

During the second half of his speech Zaykov said that the CPSU based its position, as it did before as well, on the fact that a split in the SKP should not be permitted to happen. "We are convinced that participants in the 20th SKP Congress will realize their responsibility and decisively reject any attempts to dissolve the party. We know that the great majority of SKP members now too support the fact that the party should be united and consolidated with Marxist-Leninist principles and should present these principles as regards the party's main policy line and Leninist norms for party life," Zaykov said.

CPSU Has Spoken Again

The CPSU Politburo's position on SKP internal affairs has been published since there are no more than a good 3 weeks time left before the eagerly awaited 20th SKP Congress.

Those weeks will be decisive since in the course of them the SKP, split into majority and minority factions, will reach its final decisions on the party congress.

Coming to the congress will be 196 moderates and 151 Stalinists, whose selection was preceded by close committee work so that both factions would be as united as possible.

Actually, what is at issue is moderate-faction unity and how CPSU greetings affect that faction. The Stalinists are not united either, but it is easy for them to adapt their actions to CPSU lines.

SKP-CPSU relations were dealt with last week in discussions between SKP leaders and the CPSU delegation. On Monday the chief SKP-SKDL organ, KANSAN UUTISET, published CPSU delegation head Lev Zaykov's concluding speech, which gives indications as to how matters are viewed in Moscow.

Related to Felshe

The latest Soviet assessment of the situation is closely related to the CPSU Politburo position presented just before the SKP special congress a couple of years ago, one which was published under Arvid Felshe's name.

While Zaykov's speech is more discreet -- for example, the names of those criticized were not made public -- it too clearly supports the Communist minority.

The CPSU is worried about the Marxist-Leninist foundation of the SKP's being shaken. In the Kremlin they are also concerned over the fact that in the SKP they are pushing for a national direction and disengagement from the Soviet Union and the other members of the socialist camp.

They are still surprised that in the SKP they talk about the indispensability of reacting critically to the existing form of socialism.

In like manner the CPSU announced that it does not want to meddle in the SKP's internal affairs. In the opinion of the CPSU, the cause of Finnish Communists' internal crisis is not a power struggle, but certain persons' "political-ideological attitudes and specific actions."

The issue of the CPSU's meddling in SKP affairs has for a long time annoyed the moderate Communists. A couple of years ago in Moscow Aarne Saarinen phrased the matter in this way: "What worries us is the fact that a widespread image has arisen among party members of a CPSU that protects and supports the SKP Stalinists in independent, factional actions."

In connection with the same thing Saarinen wished that the CPSU would stop talking about Arvo Aalto's historical compromise because the man who made that speech no longer proposes that solution.

His pleas fell on deaf ears since in his speech as well Zaykov raised the issue of a historical compromise. Zaykov did not mention Aalto by name, but the

opposition to Aalto implied in his speech was also in a theoretical respect particularly clear.

Zaykov's references to certain individuals were aimed at SKP Politburo moderates, who were warned against forcing the party into a situation in which it would be threatened with dissolution. Practically speaking, the CPSU was warning the SKP majority not to seek a luckless victory over the minority.

Support for Kajanoja

However, balanced between the majority and the minority, chairman Jouko Kajanoja can be very satisfied with the Soviet delegation's visit since Zaykov referred to him favorably.

Nor is first secretary Konstantin Chernenko's personal First of May greeting, apparently delivered to Kajanoja last Friday, without significance either. Obviously, the CPSU hopes Kajanoja will stay on as chairman of the SKP.

As for Kajanoja's standing, it has been seriously weakened among SKP moderates, among whom he is regarded as being too friendly with the Stalinists and therefore unsuitable as chairman of the SKP.

On Sunday Kajanoja also received the official backing of the SKP minority when Stalinist head man, Taisto Sinisalo, threw his support to his reelection.

Sinisalo revealed Stalinist objectives by proposing an agreement on the choice of SKP leaders at the coming party congress. A new factional agreement would prolong the present course of affairs in the SKP and that, on the other hand, frightens many moderates.

The SKP's problems remain unchanged.

11,466

CSC: 3617/154

'LIBERAL-WING' CP ORGAN CITES DIFFERENCES WITH CPSU

Helsinki KANSAN UUTiset in Finnish 1 May 84 p 2

[Editorial: "CPSU-SKP Discussions"]

[Text] The recently concluded discussions between the CPSU and SKP [Finnish Communist Party] delegations have confirmed the fact that they have very much the same kinds of attitudes toward the international situation, the struggle against imperialism and the importance of the fight for peace.

The parties also agree on the fundamental issues of the international communist movement. The SKP and the CPSU have completely agreeing positions on the need for developing good relations between Finland and the Soviet Union and the importance of the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Pact to both countries.

However, appraisals of the SKP's internal state of affairs and the reasons behind it once again appear to in some respects be noticeably differing from one another in the way things have been going these past few years.

While there are differences of opinion on this between the CPSU and the SKP, it is very important for us to see to it that this difference in outlook does not reach the point of disturbing good relations between the brother parties and their common struggle for peace and progress.

11,466

CSC: 3617/154

COMMENTS ON KARAMANLIS' LAST YEAR OF PRESIDENCY

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 15 May 84 p 7

[Editorial: "The Presidential Term"]

[Excerpts] The fifth and last year of Kon. Karamanlis' presidential term begins today, and as everything indicates it will be the most loaded politically. His five-year term began on 15 May 1980 with his swearing-in and ends in precisely one year. The fifth year is marked by: the Euroelections on 17 June, possible early parliamentary elections--whether they are accomplished depends directly on the result of the Euroelections--and, finally, by the selection of the third president of the Greek Republic in May 1985.

These three events are capable, by themselves, of politically charging the atmosphere. But their interweaving is far more likely to result in this charging.

The perspectives are ruled by optimistic, but also pessimistic, verifications. In the first case undoubtedly belongs Konstandinos Karamanlis' faultless performance of the presidential duties thus far.

This is not enough, however. It is necessary for an analogous behavior to be developed both by the parties which express and guide the various inclinations and set the tone for the country's political life and by the press which molds public opinion.

Unfortunately the behavior of the parties--particularly the country's two large political parties--but also of a significant part of the press is creating pessimistic speculations.

The souring of the political climate, for which the government--the government on each occasion--bears the greatest responsibility, has already assumed a troubling intensity.

Aside from this, however, the government, with the prime minister's statements, is trying to engage the president of the republic in the political game. Characteristic cases: a. The prime minister's unprovoked statement that he would support Mr. Karamanlis' candidacy for a second presidential term. Most easily pinpointed in this statement of Mr. Papandreou is the inclination for party exploitation of the PASOK theorem that "the relations of president and prime minister are excellent."

b. Mr. Papandreou's repeated indication that he is committed himself--and he only-- that parliamentary elections occur in October 1985. This "commitment" contains the clearest political expediency, for a reason connected more with a "privilege" of the president of the republic to dissolve the Chamber and proclaim elections when it is known that, according to the 1975 Constitution, the president does not have any absolute "privilege," but bindingly designated legislative, executive and regulative jurisdictions which he is obliged to exercise.

But also the official opposition often leaves the impression that on more general or more specific political issues it is awaiting some actions on the part of the president of the republic.

9247

CSO: 3521/251

RESTITUTION OF POLITICAL REFUGEES' HOLDINGS

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 18 May 84 p 15

[Article by M. Kourmoussis]

[Excerpts] The government, through Minister of Agriculture K. Simitis, is dropping the curtain on the consequences thousands of Greeks suffered from the civil war.

It is returning to political refugees the holdings which had been confiscated with various laws and two decrees. The minister of agriculture, presenting on 17 May the draft-law which regulates the issue of holdings confiscated in the civil war, stressed that the government not only is healing a wound which remained open, but also is fulfilling its programmatic declarations and PASOK's pre-electoral promise to erase remnants of the civil war and to actively assist national reconciliation.

The draft-law's regulations concern 30,000 individuals and approximately 110,000 stremmas. Of this area, approximately 20,000 stremmas belong at present to the public and will be returned immediately to the rightful parties. Thus far about 15,000 stremmas have been returned already with the procedures of laws in force. It has been calculated that one billion drachmas will be required for monetary indemnifications.

The process for transferring an exchange in land or money is short; within six months at the latest from submission of the application to the appropriate directorate in the Ministry of Agriculture, the political refugee will receive the transferred property or collect the monetary indemnification.

9247

CSO: 3521/251

CHANCES, CONSEQUENCES OF CABINET CRISIS OVER MISSILES

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 12 May 84 pp 59-61

[Article by Dr. F.A. Hoogendijk: "Cabinet Crisis Near at Hand; entire article printed in boldface]

[Text] Prominent liberals estimate the survival chances of the Lubbers Cabinet at only 30 percent. Although within the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] one is working hard on a compromise for the missile problem, the liberals are very pessimistic as to the possibility that a majority of the Second Chamber will support a positive placing decision. That is to say, if such a proposal indeed reaches the Second Chamber at all. For also in the cabinet there is no agreement as yet. A few months ago a task force (Pentagijns) was formed from the cabinet in which, besides Prime Minister Lubbers, also Ministers Gijs van Aardenne [vice prime minister], Frits Korthals-Altes [Justice], Job de Ruiter [Defense] and Hans van den Broek [foreign affairs] are seated. These ministers are thought to be working out a compromise which is first of all acceptable to all the ministers and, secondly, has a chance of succeeding in the Second Chamber. Numerous alternatives have already been discussed there. The last one was the so-called "crisis alternative" thought up by the prime minister: at Woensdrecht all the preparations for the placing of cruise missiles are being made, but the missiles themselves will only be transferred to the Netherlands in times of war threat. In other words: someone runs into your home with a gun, whereupon you quickly have to run over to your neighbors in order to get a gun to defend yourself--if the neighbor is prepared to cooperate, that is.

This crisis alternative is unacceptable to the VVD. Unjustly the impression has been formed that liberal ministers Van Aardenne and Korthals Altes had agreed with this plan. They never did so. For that matter, Lubbers also was rejected by NATO. Especially the United States refuse to accept a proposal which fundamentally deviates from the NATO dual decision. The same standpoint was taken by the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy, who have already proceeded with the placing of cruise missiles.

Mient Jan Faber (IKV [Interchurch Peace Council]) considers the crisis alternative "everyone's savior." For us the big question, however, is: Who and what is being saved? The coalition, but not our security.

In Washington the dangers of Lubbers' crisis alternative have also been pointed out. In times of great international tension, the transferring to the Netherlands of cruise missiles precisely during that period could have a provocative effect on the opponent.

Prime Minister Lubbers was rather upset when his proposal was rejected by both NATO and the VVD. After many attempts, Lubbers now is back at "Go." Actually, the prime minister is facing unsurmountable difficulties, especially because the first-responsible minister, De Ruiter, is not in favor of placing the cruise missiles. De Ruiter does not commit himself one way or the other, however. He causes the bottleneck in the entire problem. De Ruiter is following a tactics of: stay where you are and don't move. He doesn't come up with any proposals. The minister of defense continually makes it known that he is sensitive to the social consequences of a positive placing decision. He fears for a "fatal alienation between what is considered militarily essential and what is acceptable to society."

De Ruiter says that right now there is not enough social support in the Netherlands for a positive placing decision. He particularly bases his opinion on the protests of "peace movements." It is interesting what the director of the Scientific Institute of the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal], drs A.M. Oostlander, says in this respect in the monthly CHRISTIAN-DEMOCRATIC EXPLORATIONS (April 1984): "A decision in favor of the placing will naturally mobilize the peace movements to a great extent; a decision against it will encourage them in making the next demand, which will certainly not be asked less firmly! That proves their orientation toward the CDA since the time that our Parliamentary Group in the Second Chamber rejected the neutron bomb. Also reactions to the considerable decrease of the number of nuclear charges in Western Europe indicate that results in the area of nuclear arms decrease are dismissed as irrelevant."

Minister De Ruiter is right, however, when he states that the Dutch population is very divided over that missile question. From inquiries it is known just how divided the Dutch population thinks about the placing or not placing of cruise missiles: 39 percent think they should be placed in the Netherlands, 52 percent think they should not be placed. About the same percentages apply to the placing of cruise missiles in other Western European countries.

The percentages get a little closer when one asks the question of whether the security of the Netherlands would benefit by the placing of cruise missiles in our country: 48 percent say yes and 49 percent no. In our opinion De Ruiter, as an opponent of the placing, should never have accepted the post of minister of defense in this cabinet. He knew that he would have to face the decision. He is currently the greatest obstacle in the cabinet. Thought has been given to keeping the crisis within the cabinet; in other words, to replacing De Ruiter by someone else. However, one expects that this would only increase the number of opponents of placing in the CDA parliamentary group. Thus everyone is wondering now how Lubbers is going to leap that hurdle.

Not only is Lubbers facing the chore of aligning his own christian democratic ministers; it is at least just as difficult for him to also get the liberals to agree to a compromise. In order to lower the hurdle a little for the prime minister, an alternative is being worked on now in the liberal ranks with which the VVD is still trying to save the cabinet. The three members of the chamber Joris Voorhoeve, Albert-Jan Evenhuis and Ed Nijpels are particularly involved in this. This three-stage missile has to be ignited at the right moment. It is not the intention, namely, that the liberals force Prime Minister Lubbers and the CDA into a choice with this alternative. With respect to content, the VVD wants to assist the CDA by making mutual agreements between the coalition parties and the NATO partners on a Dutch nuclear overall plan. Amongst other things, this would mean that the Netherlands is now in principle speaking in favor of the actual placing in 1986 of 16 cruise missiles on our territory. In the VVD one is not taking the position that the international situation will improve in the positive sense in the coming years, but if actual indications of that should turn up, the liberals would be willing to abandon placing of the other 32 missiles. If a very strong improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States should occur, placing could be omitted altogether. The VVD plan contains many loose ends which could be joined together in the direction of the christian democrats, should the CDA want that.

Big interests are at stake. On the one hand, our national security and our credibility within the Atlantic alliance. The latter weighs very heavily for the liberals. The VVD does not want to mess about with that. The liberals are not interested in maneuvering our country into a sort of neutrality policy. Therefore, to the VVD, the cruise missiles are worth a cabinet crisis. Moreover the liberals realize that through such a crisis the country in reality becomes ungovernable. It is expected that the socialists would gain considerably in elections via the missile question. The CDA would lose heavily; the VVD, according to an inquiry by the Atlantic Commission, would win.

However, that doesn't improve things much for the liberals. A CDA/VVD coalition would then, most probably, no longer have a majority in the Second Chamber. The PvdA would become the largest party, and in practice it can only govern with the CDA. This means that the CDA would thus have to play second fiddle in a second Den Uyl cabinet. In The Hague there are speculations that such a cabinet would not survive very long.

But if such a coalition, undoubtedly after a very long cabinet formation, should get started, it means that our economic revival would be nipped in the bud. With Den Uyl as prime minister and Wim Kok as minister of social affairs the country would be flooded with employment plans, but any ray of hope for recovery in industry would disappear. The disastrous government period of Joop den Uyl in the years '73 to '77 has by no means faded from memory and from our economy. In a precarious situation, our country would receive a fatal economic blow with such a cabinet.

But also for party political relations, the early departure of the Lubbers Cabinet could have drastic consequences. The political future of the CDA

would be at stake, including that of the leader, Ruud Lubbers. It is a strange situation that all the political bosses of the CDA, i.e. Lubbers, De Vries and Bukman, are in favor of the cruise missiles in our country. A small number of people within the CDA parliamentary group who are not interested in any compromises actually not only determine the future of the cabinet, but also the future of the Christian Democratic Appeal. Those christian democratic members of the chamber who would reject a compromise of the cabinet with respect to the missile question thus take on a very great responsibility. The ELSEVIER/NIPO [Netherlands Institute for Public Opinion] poll showed that when the Second Chamber finally approves a placing decision, it would be acceptable to 55 percent of Netherlands. It further shows that 78 percent of the christian democratic voters do not want a fall of the cabinet or early elections. The same percentage applies to the liberals. Thus it is abundantly clear that among the following of the two government parties eight out of every ten voters think that the cabinet should stay and survive the cruise missile problems. That is an important piece of information.

The conviction is growing in the CDA that a decision on placing or not placing of the missiles should be postponed in order to stretch the survival of the cabinet a little longer in that manner. The VVD does not care much for a postponement. The liberal member of the Second Chamber Evenhuis, also chairman of the Defense Commission of the Second Chamber, called a postponement "very serious" in the political sense. "On the technical level a delay is perhaps possible," Evenhuis said, "but it is a matter of political will."

Within the VVD one is afraid that a further postponement until after the summer recess would increase the number of opponents to the placing rather than decrease it. Furthermore, in drawing up the budget before the third Tuesday in September [start of new parliamentary session], the liberals are not at all interested in getting all sorts of financial-economic measures started which cannot be carried out by this government anyway. Also because these measures largely will not be reversed, this could increase CDA's desire to govern together with the socialists after the fall of the current cabinet. Partly because of that reason, the VVD wants a decision in June. The liberals also find it an improper attitude toward the allies to continually keep them uncertain as to what the Netherlands really wants.

It is also a hard political fact that Lubbers cannot turn a circle into a square. It is a matter of a stalemate. And no one really entertains the hope that another alternative can be found which is acceptable to all parties. Within the government parties there is already a situation of despair.

Hence Prime Minister Lubbers "seriously takes into account" that the nuclear arms discussion "ends in a crisis" for his cabinet.

8700

CSO: 3614/88

POLL RESULTS ON LEADERS' POSITIONS IN POLITICAL SPECTRUM

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 11 May 84 p 12

[Text] Despite the well-known disagreements that have existed between them, the president of the republic and the prime minister are regarded as occupying the same political space--somewhere between the center and the center-left. Lurdes Pintasilgo is placed on the left between the PS [Socialist Party] and the PCP--but closer to the Socialists--while Mota Pinto and Freitas do Amaral are placed close to those parts of the spectrum occupied respectively by the PSD [Social Democratic Party] and the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party].

Mario Soares is considered to be slightly farther to the right than the president of the republic, although PS voters and Gen Ramalho Eanes' voters think the opposite--that is, that the chief of state is slightly farther to the right than the prime minister. On a scale of 1 to 5, with "left" corresponding to 1, "right" corresponding to 5, and center-left, center, and center-right corresponding to the numbers in between, Mario Soares scores 2.71 and Eanes 2.66.

Freitas do Amaral is regarded as being farthest to the right of all the political leaders (4.40), and Alvaro Cunhal is considered to be farthest to the left (1.15).

With an average of 1.94--that is, very close to the center-left--Lurdes Pintasilgo is considered close to the PCP, especially by voters in the PSD and the CDS, while voters in the APU [United People's Alliance] and the PS agree in placing her in the center-left.


Mota Pinto's position closely follows that of the PSD in a range between center and center-left. The APU's voters place him farthest to the right, while PSD and CDS voters put him farthest to the left--in other words, close to the center.

Oddly, Mario Soares is generally regarded as being farther to the right than the PS except in the eyes of APU voters, who, surprisingly, place the Socialist Party closer to the center than its secretary general.

Only Cunhal Seen as Intolerant


The president of the republic is the political figure classified as most tolerant by the voters, according to a poll conducted for O JORNAL by the Marktest

Lurdes Pintasilgo: Between the PS and the PCP



- Key:
- 1. Average values
 - 2. Lisbon
 - 3. Porto
 - 4. North
 - 5. South
 - 6. Men
 - 7. Women
 - 8. Voted for Eanes
 - 9. Left
 - 10. Center-left
 - 11. Center
 - 12. Center-right
 - 13. Right

Eanes Most Tolerant



Key:
 1. Tolerant
 2. Not tolerant
 3. Vertical percentages

polling firm. Alvaro Cunhal, on the other hand, is indicated as being the least tolerant.

Almost three-fifths of the voters (67 percent [as published]) consider Gen Ramalho Eanes to be a tolerant politician. That assessment is common, incidentally, to voters in all the political parties. Lurdes Pintasilgo, Mario Soares, and Helena Roseta are also considered tolerant by over 50 percent of those polled (former Prime Minister Pintasilgo by 63 percent, Prime Minister Soares by 58 percent, and the chairwoman of the Cascais Municipal Chamber, Helena Roseta, by 51 percent).

Although scoring less than 50 percent, Mota Amaral, Mota Pinto, and Freitas do Amaral nevertheless rate highly as tolerant politicians. Azorean leader Mota Amaral is considered tolerant by 45 percent of the voters and not tolerant by 25 percent, Deputy Prime Minister Mota Pinto is regarded as tolerant by 43 percent, compared to 35 percent who say he is not, and former CDS leader Freitas do Amaral is regarded as tolerant by 40 percent and as intolerant by 38 percent.

Only the APU's voters say that Mario Soares is not tolerant (50 percent, compared to 30 percent saying he is), while Communist leader Alvaro Cunhal is regarded by 44 percent of the APU's voters as being not tolerant.

Freitas do Amaral is not considered tolerant by most of the voters in the APU and the PS, while Mota Pinto scores unfavorably only among the coalition's voters, backed up by the PCP. Lurdes Pintasilgo, Helena Roseta, and--oddly-- Mota Amaral are considered tolerant by most of the voters in all the parties.

Technical Data on Poll

This survey is representative of the mainland population eligible to vote (over 18 years of age) and residing in localities with more than 10,000 inhabitants.

Interviewed were 516 individuals in 16 localities during the [unspecified] week of April 1984.

Individuals were selected for interviewing using the quota method, the control variables being sex, age, and region.

Extrapolation of the results to the universe was carried out taking into account weighting coefficients for each region.

For the total sample, the maximum error is 4.5 percent (probability of 95 percent).

The editorial treatment of these results is the responsibility of O JORNAL.

POLL RESULTS ON POPULARITY OF POLITICAL FIGURES

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 18 May 84 p 14

[Article by H. M.]

[Text] The good and bad images of the president of the republic, the government, and Parliament have faltered somewhat, apparently because of an increase in the number of undecided or uninterested voters and of people who simply feel that the performance of those three organs of sovereignty is average. It should be pointed out, however, that while the president is still the most popular of the three with the voters, the Assembly of the Republic has "caught up" with the government for the first time as far as its good image is concerned.


Despite a 6-percent improvement, the government's negative image remains quite high (45 percent), while Parliament's negative image fell to 36 percent after reaching 42 percent in February. For his part, the president of the republic had a negative image in the eyes of 12 percent (most of them CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] voters). But that is his best showing since January.

For its part, the government dropped to its lowest level of popularity (5 percent), as did the chief of state, whose popularity dropped to 27 percent. The Assembly of the Republic also received a good grade on its work from only 5 percent of the voters.

The Presidency of the Republic continues to be the best-liked organ of sovereignty in all the parties, while the government is praised by 11 percent of those who vote for the coalition parties, but barely rises above zero among APU [United People's Alliance] and CDS voters. Centrists and Socialists are the ones giving Parliament the best rating, while the president of the republic's conduct is classified as bad by about 5 percent of his own voters.

Popularity: Pintasilgo Still First

Among the best-known political leaders or former leaders, Mario Soares is the only one whose popularity increased in April, although in general, the trends remained unchanged. The prime minister managed to pass up Freitas do Amaral and Mota Amaral (both were down by 2 points), but he is still 7 points behind Lurdes Pintasilgo, who has been on top since January.



- Key:
1. President of the republic: good image continues to decline
 2. Government: only 5 percent in unconditional support
 3. Parliament: lack of popularity continues
 4. Image good or very good
 5. Image bad or very bad

The former prime minister [Pintasilgo] is still the best-liked leader within the PS [Socialist Party] (35 percent) and among Eanes' voters (32 percent), but she is rated most highly in the APU (45 percent), although behind Zita Seabra, Alvaro Cunhal, and Carlos Brito.

Soares, whose good image in the APU adds up to a big zero, scored 29 percent and 22 percent respectively in the PS and the PSD [Social Democratic Party]. The Social Democrats prefer the following over the prime minister, and in this order: Mota Amaral, Mota Pinto, Alberto Joao Jardim, Freitas do Amaral, and Lucas Pires. Among the centrists, Freitas is still safe, with Lucas Pires right behind him, while Mota Pinto and Mario Soares each received 10 percent.

Alvaro Cunhal also continues to be the leader with the worst image (46 percent), since in all the parties--except the APU, naturally--he is the leader receiving the lowest score. Eanes' voters particularly dislike Mota Pinto and, after him, Freitas do Amaral and Alvaro Cunhal. As far as the APU is concerned, the leader with the worst image is Mota Pinto (92 percent), followed by Soares (84 percent).

Presidential Race

Mario Soares has regained the ground lost since January and is again in second place in the presidential race, immediately behind Lurdes Pintasilgo, who is still out in front with 20 percent of the voters intending to vote for her. According to the results of the Marktest-0 JORNAL poll for April, Freitas do Amaral and Mota Amaral have dropped significantly from the positions they held in March and are now down to about 8 percent each.

In April, Mario Soares would have been the candidate receiving the most votes from the PS and would have been in second place in the APU and in third place in the PSD. In his own party, the prime minister would have received 34 percent of the vote, but he had to contend with Lurdes Pintasilgo (23 percent). In the APU, all bets would be on Pintasilgo, who would have received 57 percent of the vote, while Soares would have wound up with about 4 percent.

Mota Amaral continues to be the preferred candidate in the PSD (21 percent), followed by Freitas (17 percent) and Soares (9 percent). The former CDS chairman would be way out in front as the choice of the CDS (41 percent), followed by Mota Amaral (14 percent) and, surprisingly, Firmino Miguel (7 percent). Eanes' voters would divide their votes chiefly between Pintasilgo (29 percent) and Soares (20 percent).

Very surprising is the 4-percent drop for Freitas do Amaral, while the setback for Azorean leader Mota Amaral was expected following his defeat at the PSD congress. The former CDS chairman, who had achieved a score of 14 percent in February and 12 percent in March, is now down to the lowest point he has ever reached in the Marktest-0 JORNAL barometer.

In view of that, it is not surprising that Mario Soares might beat Freitas do Amaral in the second round. Soares would receive 37 percent of the vote, compared to only 22 percent for the former prime minister. On the other hand,

Freitas do Amaral would have the majority of the PSD's voters and almost all of the CDS behind him.

Oddly, the spontaneous voting intentions of the voters (names not suggested on a list) confirm the trend pointing toward a slight rise for Soares, stabilization in the case of Lurdes Pintasilgo, and a decline for Freitas do Amaral and Mota Amaral.

Legislative Elections

If elections for the Assembly of the Republic were held now, the PS would win again with 40 percent of the vote--its best score since January, when the Marktest-0 JORNAL barometer was started. That is 5 points more than it received the month before. The PSD, which was passed up by the APU in March, would be back in second place with 22 percent, while the coalition supported by the communists is down by 2 points to 21 percent. A 2-percent drop would also be suffered by the CDS in a reversal of its previous upward trend.

Even if the legislative elections included a party supported by Eanes, the PS would still do better than it would have the month before, while the APU would drop slightly and the PSD would improve slightly. For its part, the CDS would be down by 4 points.

Technical Data on Poll

This survey is representative of the mainland population eligible to vote (over 18 years of age) and residing in localities with more than 10,000 inhabitants.

Interviewed were 516 individuals in 16 localities during the [unspecified] week of April 1984.

Individuals were selected for interviewing using the quota method, the control variables being sex, age, and region.

Extrapolation of the results to the universe was carried out taking into account weighting coefficients for each region.

For the total sample, the maximum error is 4.5 percent (probability of 95 percent).

The editorial treatment of these results is the responsibility of O JORNAL.

11798

CS0: 3542/34

ADELSOHN STEPS UP ATTACK ON PALME FOR SUB AFFAIR HANDLING

Lack of Firmness Attacked

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 16 May 84 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Ulf Adelsohn, leader of the Swedish Conservative Party by Lars Christiansson; date and place not specified]

[Text] "The Conservatives do not want to change Sweden's foreign policy. The party agrees with the government on the basic questions. It is the government's way of managing foreign policy and the negative results of it for the country that we are attacking."

That was said by Conservative Party leader Ulf Adelsohn in an interview with SVENSKA DAGBLADET in answer to Prime Minister Olof Palme's demand to know what the Conservatives want to change in Swedish foreign policy.

[Question] But is there nothing you want to change? The Conservatives have certainly directed extensive criticism against the government.

[Answer] We are in agreement on Swedish foreign policy as it applies to neutrality and most other questions. But it is the way of carrying out the policy that we criticize.

[Question] Is there no issue on which you would change Swedish foreign policy?

[Answer] We do not want to overdramatize the differences. But we are very critical of parts of the foreign policy which include sending billions of Swedish foreign aid to socialist states.

[Question] You spoke of managing. What is wrong with the government's way of managing foreign policy and the submarine question?

[Answer] As to the submarine policy, the government uses every opportunity to tone down the violations. That is regardless of who it is in the government that is speaking.

[Question] Specifically what do you mean?

[Answer] The government does not want to call back the Submarine Commission. The government did not consider it sufficiently serious, when the OB [Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces] delivered his report on Karlskrona, to call in the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs. But when it was a question of an alleged violation of Olof Palme's person, the council was called in on 24 hours notice. The OB's report was passed to the party leaders instead, and the prime minister chose not to be present at the press conference about the submarine violations in Karlskrona.

'More Balance'

Neither did the government stand behind the OB's report. The prime minister said that he had no reason to criticize the OB. In a newspaper article he said "...if submarine violations took place."

We are also critical that the prime minister did not make more than one small mention of the submarine violations in his May Day speech. Afghanistan was mentioned in one single sentence, while Central America was treated in an entire section. We are seeking more balance.

Palme did not take up the Harsfjarden incident in the conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko. During the middle of the antisubmarine search in Karlskrona, the government took the initiative to invite the Soviet Minister of Agriculture. It was the Swedish government which unilaterally took that initiative.

[Question] But what is it really that you want to change?

[Answer] There is no reason to criticize the government because it has not pointed to any nation as being guilty of the violations, when not even the military can do that. Neither is there reason to attack the government because it lacked the will forcefully to attack the submarines. Nor because the government says that Swedish neutrality is firm and that we are forcefully protecting Swedish territory.

But the criticism is that the government tones down the seriousness of the violations, and will not take them up in different international organizations as, for example, the Stockholm Conference.

[Question] How do you think that the government should act toward the Soviet Union? You are the only one of the leading politicians who has said that there is reason to suspect the Soviet Union of the continuing violations.

[Answer] We do not want to freeze relations with the Soviet Union, nor freeze commercial relations. I have myself sat and spoken about submarine violations with the Soviet ambassador to Stockholm Boris Pankin. But the

invitation to the Soviet minister of agriculture is something else. It is Sweden making a normalization contact with the Soviet Union in the middle of the ongoing antisubmarine search, when their leaders must understand that we suspect them of violations. In that way we risk our intentions being misunderstood in Moscow.

What we want from the government is good judgment, firmness and consistency in foreign policy.

As examples of the areas in which the government erred, according to the Conservatives, there are the Bahr affair, the Bildt affair, the Hasselo conflict with Denmark, the Ferm affair and the BPA affair.

All are examples of Sweden's prime minister "overreacting" and/or conducting himself in a way which can cause misunderstanding of Swedish foreign policy.

[Question] Do the Conservatives still demand that Palme should leave the Palme Commission?

[Answer] Yes, we must know whether he is speaking for the commission or for Sweden. As long as he is chairman of the commission it is difficult for the rest of the world to know. It also creates uncertainty.

[Question] Do you firmly believe in the violations?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Do you also believe that the submarines came from the East?

[Answer] Of course we have no proof of that in Gasefjarden and in Harsfjarden and after that the violations continued. I do not know for certain which nation is behind them, but one cannot escape the suspicion that it is the Soviets which continue it.

[Question] Do you consider the government's message too soft toward the Soviet Union?

[Answer] Not necessarily only toward the Soviet Union. We are a small and peaceful country. We have a security conference in Stockholm at the same time that we are violated by foreign submarines. So we believe that those who did this have their representatives at the conference. So then was an excellent opportunity to say how seriously we view the violation of Swedish territory.

[Question] Whose fault is it that the Conservative Party and the government are continuously at odds over security policy?

[Answer] My concern is that the prime minister is trying to suppress a constructive debate. One should be able to reach a common view of the goals,

but have different ideas about the means. That is natural in a democracy. Then one can give an account of these without getting into a great conflict. I have never met any other politician during all of my activity with whom there has been such squabbling, rows and confrontation as with Olof Palme.

[Question] What is your opinion of the Soviet Union's intentions in the Nordic countries?

[Answer] The Soviet Union has a very definite starting point. That is the Soviet Union, everything else must give way to that. That is rather natural. All countries act that way. That means that they have a very strong requirement for security. They always act from Soviet interests.

Because of the Soviet buildup on the Kola Peninsula and the increased importance of the Baltic, our area also has greater politico-military importance. That influences and naturally increases their interest in us. Concern in the world and tension between the superpowers influences that also.

[Question] Do the Soviets have any aggressive intentions toward us?

[Answer] Sweden has been at peace for 170 years. The last time we had a war with the Soviets was in 1809. Independent of regime, we have had peace with this powerful eastern neighbor and we have no reason to believe other than that the Soviet Union wants peace and understanding with Sweden, even if we have different viewpoints. But in a tense situation they are never ready to accept anything which can damage their own interests.

It is also thus for Sweden; we have only one thing to think about in such a situation---that is Sweden.

I have no reason to believe that there is any kind of spontaneous aggressiveness in the Soviet Union.

[Question] But you have openly aired your suspicions that the Soviet Union is behind the violations. Is that not a sign of aggression?

[Answer] It is not a sign of the opposite.

[Question] One question to which you may answer yes or no. Did or did not Palme read the entire Ferm letter in the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs?

[Answer] It will never be entirely explained whether he read it verbatim or wove in words and comments or versions.

Comprehensive Policy Explanation Needed

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 May 84 p 5

[Commentary by Ulf Adelsohn, Conservative Party chairman: "Don't Take the Submarines Seriously"]

[Text] "We Conservatives take very seriously the military and political pressures to which Sweden is exposed. The Social Democrats prefer to tone down the seriousness of the situation and the need to draw some conclusions from it," writes Conservative Party leader Ulf Adelsohn as he here responds to Prime Minister Olof Palme's debate contribution in Friday's DAGENS NYHETER.

The submarine violations strike against the foundations of our nonallied policy, which aims toward neutrality in war. Sweden has followed this policy for generations.

On the one side is Sweden's continuing effort to again be the master in its own house, and to protect its own territorial integrity in an effective way.

On the other side is the demand by a foreign power for military operational freedom and more security.

Our neutrality policy demands that we use all available means to protect our territorial integrity. We know from the bitter war years in the Nordic area the consequences that neglect can have for the credibility of a nation's struggle for neutrality.

It is undeniable that the tense climate which has grown between the super-powers since the end of the 70's also influences the situation in the Nordic countries. It is often the small which must pay the price for tests of power by the great.

But the submarine violations do not have their roots primarily in the chill between Moscow and Washington. The basis is instead the decisive change in the strategic importance of Northern Europe and the North Atlantic area. That change took place since the end of the 60's, and the consequences have gradually become obvious since the end of the 70's.

Parts of this area have become the base and shelter area for crucial parts of the Soviet nuclear second team or reserve forces. This has caused a development toward changed military dispositions and increased political attention from the Soviet Union as well as NATO. We would have had this development even with a permanent policy of relaxation of tensions.

For several years the submarine operations directed against Sweden have reached a new and much more serious character. The number of operations has increased, and foreign military units are penetrating our most sensitive military areas, directed against Swedish defensive installations.

I am convinced that the years immediately ahead will be of decisive importance for how Sweden's neutrality policy will be perceived in the future. Sweden must be capable of bringing the submarine violations to a halt, otherwise there is a risk that both the domestic and foreign confidence in our policy and its capability in a critical situation will be weakened.

The submarine violations contain a military challenge. At the same time there is reason to note the political stings that have with great force and frequency been aimed at Sweden in the wake of the submarine debate by various Soviet officials. Together they are transmitting the desire that the shape of the Swedish neutrality policy be modified so that it can more easily be reconciled with more expanded Soviet security ambitions. Statements during recent years by such leading persons as Georgiy Arbatov, Vadim Zagladin and Aleksandr Bovin demonstrate that.

Debates between the Social Democrats and the Conservatives on the foreign and security-political area seem to partly depend on different judgments of the seriousness of that situation.

We Conservatives take a very serious view of the military and political pressure which Sweden is exposed to, and we consider that it must have consequences for the shaping of foreign and defense policy. It seems that the Social Democrats prefer to tone down the seriousness of the situation, and the necessity of drawing conclusions from it.

As an example it can be pointed out that it is extremely seldom that the prime and foreign ministers spontaneously take up these problems in their public statements. Neither of them have even tried to present a common view of the background of the submarine crisis, its importance and its consequences.

In his public statements the prime minister has devoted much greater attention to the CIA mining of Nicaragua's coastal waters than to the serious penetration of submarines and attack divers which was happening at the same time in our own waters.

It is often said by the government that pressure from outside will not cause us to reconsider the basis for our policies. That is correct and important. But to that should be added that a changed situation places new demands when it comes to specific shaping of the policy. It is highly important that we do not give the outside world the impression that the violations are inconsequential.

In that situation we Conservatives have sought a stronger defense policy and a stiffer foreign policy.

The four-party agreement on defense expenditures is important. It showed, exactly as did the Submarine Commission's report, our ability for national unity on decisive security-political questions. It was an important signal to the outside world.

In recent years foreign policy has been the object of both criticism and debate. This has concerned questions of fact as well as form, and the importance of the latter is not being discounted.

There are several reasons for this. The Palme government has sometimes bypassed the professional competence of the foreign office administration. The Bahr affair was one example, the Ferm affair was another. A lack of coordination has sometimes led to conflicting statements in a way that has caused confusion even on very central questions. For example it took 6 weeks before the prime minister corrected the foreign minister's statement about the thoroughly peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union. And no explanation of the conflict between the statements by the defense and foreign ministers on the submarine violations has yet been given.

In addition the government at decisive times has broken the tradition of consultation which was present in Swedish foreign policy. The Bahr affair began here. The West German opposition had greater insight into and influence over Swedish foreign policy than the Swedish Riksdag had. And since then it continued with the Ferm affair, on which the prime minister has refused to answer questions before the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs.

In this way confidence is eroded. Furthermore there is a conflict with the spirit of the constitution when there is an obligation to inform the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs.

Swedish foreign policy in the immediate future years must be dominated by the requirements imposed by national security. We no longer live in a time when the main tasks of Swedish foreign policy are in far off corners of the world, but in a period when the tasks in the Nordic and nearby European areas must dominate.

Neither can we permit compromise products of international commissions to be automatically transformed into Swedish foreign policy.

Carefulness is required when it comes to relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union. Although there is a strong mutual interest in developing these, that does not necessarily mean that these interests are identical.

The greatest possible use must be made of the traditional diplomatic channels in order for Moscow to clearly understand our unshakeable will to fulfill our security-political policies. These contacts must be intensified as soon as possible.

At the same time there is reason for a certain stiffness toward the Soviet desire for friendly gestures of a more symbolic nature as long as we are not convinced that the Soviet submarine operations against Sweden have been stopped. That was also the government's idea as late as last fall.

It is our opinion that it was unwise to now appear as though we were convinced that the Soviet Union is innocent of all violations which took place during the past year.

That was the background of our criticism against the headlong normalization of the exchange of ministers with the Soviet Union during the middle of the Karlskrona incident. That debate is now behind us.

Unity exists on most of the important questions of foreign policy. That is true, for example, of the basis for security policy, the importance of Nordic cooperation and the efforts to carry out Sweden's traditional line in disarmament policy.

On other questions opinions diverge. This is most obvious in foreign aid policy, where the Social Democrats want to continue sending billions to Vietnam, in spite of that country's occupation of its neighbors. We Conservatives place greater weight than the Social Democrats on the protection of human rights and freedom and on the important difference between democracy and dictatorship.

And clearly our differences of opinion apply also to how seriously we regard the new security-political situation, which has been illustrated by the submarine violations in such a dramatic way.

In an open democracy such as Sweden foreign and defense policy do not dominate free debate. Demands from outside that the debate be restricted show how important it is. Furthermore open dialogue creates assumptions for building new unity on incomplete points.

But the debate should deal with issues of fact, and it must be conducted with mutual respect.

In a political debate we are all guilty of boasting. That happens sometimes in the heat of conflict.

But Olof Palme first paints a libelous picture of the selected opponent's viewpoints with heavy strokes. Then he follows with a thundering shock attack against these hastily erected windmills. And he concludes with cries that the whole event was somewhat painful, but that he, in exalted majesty, has accomplished an important act of trash removal.

Unity is required around a policy of national security which will give our efforts for neutrality strength, and will contribute to stability in the

Nordic area. But then we must resume the trusting dialogue which by tradition is Swedish foreign policy. The seriousness of the challenges which our security policy is now confronting demands gathering around a strong defense policy and a strict foreign policy.

9287

CSO: 3650/212

ADELSOHN VIRTUALLY ALONE IN CONDUCTING NONSOCIALIST OPPOSITION

Stockholm 7 DAGAR in Swedish 11 May 84 pp 6-7

[Commentary by Christina Jonsson]

[Text] The opposition has had a hard time in recent months. With Falldin sick and Westerberg outside parliament, Adelson has been the only opposition leader in Riksdag. They are all needed there to match the government's heavy Social Democratic team of Palme, Feldt and Andersson.

"Look out!" Ulf Adelson yelled.

The driver of the party bus just missed throwing the Conservative leader through the windshield by a few millimeters.

"You have to be a little careful with me now," said Adelson, who is very aware that he is the only nonsocialist party leader in parliament.

Yes, there is a shortage of opposition leaders in the Swedish Riksdag at this time. But does it really matter whether or not party leaders take part, play a visible role in parliamentary activity? Thorbjorn Falldin has been away for a long time, suffering from an ulcer. Bengt Westerberg, who does not have a seat in parliament, has been practically interpreted to death politically and his salvation is said to lie in an Ola Ullsten in parliament. Ulf Adelson joked about this one-man role as he rushed back to Riksdag after a quick visit to the so-called "free building" in Uppsala, a structure where standard housing norms did not have to be followed to the letter.

Do party leaders play such a big role? Is it Falldin's illness and Westerberg's nonexistent seat in Riksdag that have made the opposition less visible during the winter and spring, the debates tamer and the government so successful?

The general public's awareness of crisis is now eroding in step with the many encouraging reports, all of which indicate that Sweden and the Social Democratic government are on the right track.

The political and economic winds are blowing in a favorable direction. The opposition's role is a thankless one. Calls for restraint, warnings about the future sound somewhat shrill. It is certainly a hard job to win over public opinion when the devaluation is working so perfectly, when budget deficits are declining and the balance of trade is improving. In addition, the government is successfully exploiting themes such as acid rain, freedom and the future, while peace has long been a Social Democratic province.

Rapid Tempo

The opposition parties and especially their leaders are doing the best they can. During the spring Ulf Adelsohn and Bengt Westerberg have systematically traveled around among the voters at a rapid tempo, delivering well-prepared speeches in an effort to revise public opinion on one issue after another. For Ulf Adelsohn's part this has recently involved housing policy in Bollnas, family policy in Vimmerby and unemployment in Trollhattan. In this past week he was on the road from Monday to Friday. Bengt Westerberg has performed in a similar fashion and he has put the final touches on two major program speeches on "forgotten Sweden" and the "freedom speech" which he will present in his upcoming 3-day tour starting on 14 May. They travel, meet people, shape public opinion and make contacts.

But only one of them, Ulf Adelsohn, also has parliamentary exposure. Is that so important?

Yes, it is! For two reasons. First, work in Riksdag dominates the political attention of the nationwide media. Bengt Westerberg had this to say:

"I am very satisfied with the opposition work in such things as the Dagmar debate, for example."

Who has heard about that? People in Kalmar?

No matter how important the speeches Bengt Westerberg makes in various parts of the country are, they are mainly reported in the local press. If they are mentioned at all in the national media, it is a brief report

And second, our present government party is dominated to an unusual extent by a few people, two or perhaps three. They are Olof Palme, Kjell-Olof Feldt and to some extent Sten Andersson. In Riksdag there is an A, a B and a C team in all parties, just as there is in any soccer club. To play on the A team against a Kjell-Olof Feldt, a Falldin, Westerberg or Adelsohn is needed.

Adelsohn has been alone. According to several observers he has not measured up as sole opposition leader. Not only was the finance minister able to squelch the questions of the Conservative B team, he has also succeeded in making short work of the Conservative Party leader's criticisms.

"No, on the contrary I think the debates have been down to earth, not awkward," Ulf Adelsohn commented.

Heavy Load

At the same time he said it has been a heavy load, very heavy. But when he says he thinks things are looking up for the opposition, what does he mean?

Upcoming debates in Riksdag. In the past Ulf Adelsohn, like Bengt Westerberg, questioned the great value for a party leader of sitting in Riksdag. Now he, and perhaps Westerberg too, has changed his mind:

"During the winter and spring the government had the initiative in Riksdag activity, now it is our turn. There are several big debates left in which we will take the initiative," said Ulf Adelsohn.

He said that it might really be a disadvantage for Bengt Westerberg in this situation to be unable to speak out, to get the exposure provided by the debates. The Conservative leader also said he had missed Thorbjorn Falldin during the spring.

The Center leader is hoping to get a clean bill of health on 16 May. He is undoubtedly also hoping that as in 1983 he will be able to show his ability in an important political situation to step in and take a central position in the debate, as he did in the finance debate last year.

The summer recess of Riksdag is scheduled to begin on 8 June. Before that time foreign policy and foreign aid must be dealt with. Along with defense appropriations, regional policy, business, energy, agricultural, research and family policies.

And the grand finale will be the finance debate. Some observers, including former Liberal leader Ola Ullsten, have this to say:

"Bengt Westerberg is the only one aside from Thorbjorn Falldin who can match Finance Minister Feldt in a debate of this kind."

Ola Ullsten is the one who is "blocking" the seat from which Bengt Westerberg could challenge Kjell-Olof Feldt. Why doesn't he make a move?

"No one has asked me to. When I get the job I want, I will be ready to leave party politics. I have already announced that I will not seek re-election and I am hoping for a speedy solution," said Ola Ullsten.

Place in Riksdag

In the past Bengt Westerberg said that a place in Riksdag for him was not relevant before 1985. Has he changed his mind?

"No..."

He drags it out. No one, either Bengt Westerberg or anyone else in the Liberal Party, will even ask Ola Ullsten to leave a post. But it is not an

exaggeration to say that they will not be sorry the day that Ola Ullsten gets a job he can accept from Olof Palme and the government. Ullsten himself and the rest of the Liberals are longing for this to happen.

Until a few days ago Westerberg was content to travel around and meet people. A short time ago, for example, he was quite pleased to lead a seminar on the future at which Professor David Ingvar stated that the brain is a liberal organ. But after the Sunday figures from the latest DN/IMU [DAGENS NYHETER/Institute for Market Research] opinion poll the situation has changed. Now the Liberal Party has the support of 5.5 percent of the voters and has been dubbed the "elves' party." Now there is a crisis again.

Back in 1982 Bengt Westerberg tried to climb up a little with the party's nomination to the so-called Stockholm list. At the time he was beaten by Hadar Cars, among others. That is why today he is in ninth place. It has been said that all those higher on the list than Westerberg would be willing to step aside in favor of the party leader. Maybe so, but feelings are strong, especially as to whether the most important thing for the Liberal Party right now is a seat in Riksdag for the party leader.

"It is an advantage for the party but it is not important," said Birgit Friggebo.

Hers is the first name on the list after Ola Ullsten's. Birgit Friggebo would not say whether she would refuse a seat.

"The party will decide that," was her answer to the question. Olle Wastberg is among others whose names appear ahead of Bengt Westerberg.

"Let Birgit Friggebo have a seat in parliament, that would be good. It is absolutely unnecessary to have Westerberg seated there, no one cares about what happens in Riksdag," said Olle Wastberg.

But he added that it is "quite possible the rest of us would step aside." Those who have said they would step aside are Bonnie Bernstrom, Margareta Andren and Hadar Cars.

Bonnie Bernstrom would like to see Westerberg in Riksdag as soon as possible. Although, "Ola must decide when he wants to quit."

"If the question comes up, of course I would step aside," said Margareta Andren, but, "Ola must decide himself."

"If Ola Ullsten leaves parliament, I would definitely work to see that Bengt Westerberg takes his place," said Hadar Cars.

Hadar Cars does not feel that the party leader's seat in Riksdag is a decisive factor for the party, but believes that the foremost representative of the Liberal Party should be seen in parliament. Gertrud Hedberg could not be reached.

What about Ola Ullsten? He must decide himself, as we said before.

"There are both advantages and drawbacks for Bengt Westerberg with regard to not having a seat in parliament," he said.

One drawback is the dilemma that out of consideration for the present party leader, the former hardly acts at all. Swedish politics is not just Riksdag work, especially not the action of party leaders in Riksdag, all sides are maintaining shrilly. No, but the fact that Bengt Westerberg has restored the man-in-the-street profile to the Liberal Party, for example, is evidently not enough. Now he and his party, like all the rest, must measure themselves against the others--in parliament. By this fall, if not sooner. It will be too late in 1985--there will be an election then for the Liberal Party as well.

6578

CSO: 3650/210

POLITICAL DEBATE CONTINUES OVER AMNESTY ISSUE

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 7 May 84 pp 1, 15

[Text] Nejat Tunsiper, chairman of the Internal Affairs Committee of TBMM [Turkish Grand National Assembly] said: "I believe that my proposal for an amnesty law will pass [our party's parliamentary] group." Tunsiper said that he believed the proposed law would be discussed in this parliamentary session.

Tunsiper of ANAP [Motherland Party] submitted the proposed amnesty law on 2 May 1984 to the Executive Committee of the ANAP group. According to the party rules, if the group does not discuss the proposed law within 15 days, the proposal is submitted automatically to the speaker of the Assembly. Accordingly, in case the ANAP group does not conclude its debate on the proposed law by 17 May 1984, the proposal will be sent by the speaker of the Assembly to the Justice Committee. Tunsiper sets out in his proposed law the pardon of sentences of up to 10 years with all its ramifications, the pardon of a 10 year portion of sentences over 10 years and pardon of all kinds of cash fines. Death penalties are commuted into life sentences and life sentences into 24 years imprisonment. Crimes against the state, treason, organized smuggling and crimes of establishing armed organizations and forestry crimes are not covered by the amnesty. Pardon of disciplinary misconduct is proposed.

It is expected that the proposed amnesty law of Nejat Tunsiper will be debated in tomorrow's meeting of the assembly group of ANAP.

Nejat Tunsiper, while answering questions by NOKTA magazine related to the proposed amnesty law said that his proposal did not cover political crimes; if it did, it would have no chance of passing TBMM.

Tunsiper answered the questions directed to him concerning this subject as follows:

Question: You submitted your proposal to the executive committee of the party group. What if it is refused?

Tunsiper: I will insist that it be debated in the party group.

Question: And if your party does not agree with your proposal?

Tunsiper: Why should they not agree, why should I disagree with my party and why should my party disagree with me?

Question: Did you contact the other parties while preparing the proposal?

Tunsiper: Why should I need the assistance of other parties? I have a party.

Question: Your proposal does not cover political crimes.

Tunsiper: No. If it did, it would have no chance of passing the TBMM.

Question: But this subject will be debated.

Tunsiper: I prepared my proposal in accordance with society's expectations. Let not everyone attempt to pull it apart.

CANVER of HP [Populist Party]

Cneyt Canver, the deputy from Adana of HP, while answering questions by a reporter of ANKA [Ankara News Agency] concerning the proposal, stated that the coverage of the proposed amnesty law prepared by Tunsiper of ANAP was not sufficient.

Canver who suggested that ANAP with the proposed amnesty law was seeking political gains, continued as follows:

"The most obvious of ANAP's objections to our proposed changes to the enforcement code and our proposal for amnesty is that the conditions for amnesty do not yet exist and consequently are premature. ANAP's submittal of an amnesty proposal one week after raising these objections, as if the bases and conditions had changed in one week, is the greatest proof of their partisan approach to the problem which does not benefit the public. For, no extraordinary or distinct event has occurred in Turkey within one week to necessitate the declaration of an amnesty."

Cuneyt Canver added to his words his wish that the government would promulgate, instead of a limited coverage amnesty law, a law that would cover individuals convicted of organized activities as described in Subsection 5, Article 141 of TCK [Turkish Criminal Law] specifically, in a form that would answer all expectations of the society.

12591

CSO: 3554/221

GUNBOATS 'TURUNMAA', 'KARJALA' BEING COMPLETELY REFURBISHED

Helsinki. Helsingin Sanomat in Finnish 1 May 84 p 8

[Article by Olli Hakkarainen and Martti Teikkila]

[Text] The gunboats "Turunmaa" and "Karjala" will be completely overhauled and modernized this and next year. After they are modernized, the Navy plans to use the vessels until the end of this century.

The main idea behind the repairs is for the gunboats to be able to function as the lead ships for the "Helsinki"-class missile boats, provided with the latest equipment, in addition to performing their other tasks.

To perform this function, the gunboats' already obsolete electronic systems will be modernized to bring them up to the level of the electronics of modern missile boats.

The procurement contracts have not yet been signed, but it is very likely that the Dutch-Swedish Philips electronics systems will be installed in the gunboats, as they have been in the missile boats.

The Navy has received a 20-million-markka appropriation for basic repairs for this and next year. According to Navy estimates, the updating of the gunboats will cost about 20 percent of the price of new vessels.

As ships go, the gunboats are not yet very old; they were built in 1967. A warship's lifespan is ordinarily from 25 to 30 years, but it is subjected to at least one thorough drydock overhaul in that space of time.

Among others, the Navy earlier fully refurbished the minelayer "Keihassalmi" and five R-class minesweepers. The minesweepers were transformed into coast-guard ships capable of combatting submarines.

The renovation of the gunboats is scheduled to take a couple of years. A renovation of the "Turunmaa" will take a year's time and they plan to get it into the water for the 1985 sailing season. Overhaul of the "Karjala" will begin in the spring of next year.

The gunboats were built at Wartsila's Helsinki shipyard, so renovating them will go quite smoothly for the same company. Wartsila has experience in building warships; most recently the first "Helsinki"-class missile boat was built at the shipyard a couple of years ago.

The next three "Helsinki"-class boats will also be built at Wartsila's Helsinki shipyard.

Guns Will Still Be Chief Weapons

Corresponding in size and original armament to a corvette, the "Turunmaa" is 74.1 meters long and 7.8 in the beam with a displacement of 700 tons, a maximal capacity of about 22,000 HP with the original engines and a top speed of over 30 knots.

The vessel's hull is of steel and the deck structures are largely of aluminum. Tactically important areas are armored. Wartsila recently familiarized itself with the demanding aluminum technique when it was building the missile boat "Helsinki" and the hydrofoil "Larus."

The "Turunmaa" and "Karjala's" chief weapon will still be the 120-mm fully automatic gun. The rate of fire of the weapon developed by Bofors is 70 rounds a minute. The 40-mm aft-deck guns are also Swedish-made. However, the 23-mm anti-aircraft guns are Soviet-made.

The chief architects of this modernization, engineer-Captains Auvo Vappula and Esko Huhta-Koivisto stressed the fact that vessels the size of gunboats need an anti-aircraft missile system as their anti-aircraft weapon.

The Navy has not, however, received an appropriation to procure anti-aircraft missiles.

After the repairs, the armament for the "Turunmaa" and "Karjala" will, in conformity with their class name, be based on guns. The captains assured us that the chief weapon, a 120-mm automatic gun that employs impact shells, is still effective for both anti-aircraft and other artillery uses.

In connection with the refurbishing, the guns' anti-aircraft capacity will be improved by equipping the vessels with an auxiliary optronic fire-direction system.

It will especially increase the guns' ability to combat low-flying targets -- for example, cruise missiles -- and also enable them to simultaneously fire at many targets.

In addition, two double-barreled 23-mm automatic guns will be installed on the upper decks of the "Turunmaa" and "Karjala" instead of the single guns they now have. Two 40-mm automatic guns employing impact shells are also still in use for anti-aircraft purposes.

On both boats there are in addition two depth-rocket throwers and two depth-charge launchers.

Many specific decisions were made about the gunboats as necessary at the time. The engine system, for example, was settled on on the basis of 35 different alternatives and they finally decided on the present combination of a gas turbine and diesel engines. With diesel engines the boats are capable of traveling 5,000 nautical miles without having to take on fuel.

Engines Will Remain the Same As Before

A Brown Boveri power turbine was combined with a gas generator manufactured by Rolls Royce. The first experiences in combining a gas turbine with diesel engines as the chief motive power for warships were acquired in the 1950's.

After maintenance, the engines will remain as they were before. The tunnel propeller — a so-called diffusion propeller — used with the gas-turbine engine will, on the other hand, have to be completely overhauled in Turku; it will be altogether replaced.

The main overhaul operations will, however, be concentrated on the updating of armament and operational readiness.


Aside from the usual shipyard work, in planning the project they did not, to be sure, completely forget the 70-man crew either. All the furniture in the sleeping quarters will be replaced, more portholes will be added to the mess-rooms and small saunas will be built on the boats.

Next Project Will Be Coast-Guard Cutter 90

According to the Navy, modernization of the gunboats is a worthwhile project, even though they will have to make room for new boats as we approach the year 2000.

An actual replacement plan has not yet been made public, but the Coast-Guard Cutter 90 project will in part replace the gunboats as well. The coast-guard cutters will, however, chiefly phase out the "Nuoli"-class motorized gunboats.

The coast-guard cutter project will be pushed with the Coast Guard. The Naval Patrol calls the coast-guard cutter a heavy coast-guard ship. This year's budget contains requisition authorizations for a fifth outer patrol ship and a heavy coast-guard ship.



Key:

1. 40-mm gun.
2. Twin 23-mm gun.
3. 120-mm gun.

After modernization, the guns will continue to be the chief weapons of the "Turunmaa" and "Karjala." Aft there are two Swedish-made, 40-mm Bofors guns and at the bow a 120-mm cannon manufactured by the same factory. During the refurbishing the Soviet-made twin 230mm antiaircraft gun, located amidships, will get another one of the same type alongside it.

11,466

CSC: 3617/154

DEFENSE MINISTER THUNBORG COMMENTS ON JOB, BACKGROUND

Stockholm MANADS JOURNALEN in Swedish Jun 84 pp 56-64

[Article by Dieter Strand]

[Text] Will Thunborg scale back on armaments? Or will he increase them? Publicly he says the answer is neither of the above.

He carried out his compulsory military service during Sven Andersson's long reign. Now he is in charge of refresher training exercises--but misses New York. Palme is very satisfied with him, except when he smokes. Then he has to sit outside the government's conference room. He is 168 cm tall, has bangs, used to be a speedway driver and will soon be 50 years old. What does he think about defense and submarines? It is not easy to find out. But he does not feel we have any reason to view the future in a dark light. And he is on good terms with Gromyko, so they say.

"Halt!" The military policeman stood squarely in the middle of the road and held his hand up to stop our car. "MP" was written in white letters on his helmet. His white gloves gleamed against the gray uniform, his submachine gun clinked, his heavy boots scraped against the gravel

He could have been an American Marine 10 years ago in the Mekong Delta outside Saigon. But he was a Swedish military policeman encountered a few months ago on the road leading from Almos Golf Course past Forkarla Public Park to Hasslo Bridge outside Karlskrona.

"You may proceed. Have a nice day," said the military policeman while he handed our ID cards back through the car window, and I was almost surprised that he didn't say it in English.

Then we proceeded as slowly as possible across the bridge to Hasslo. We could see the net that hung from the bridge and extended down into the

water. Sand bags and soldiers with grenade rifles lined the bridge parapet. Out on the bay toward Karlskrona, with its familiar silhouette of tall cranes and church towers, a patrol boat cruised while a Vertol helicopter hovered nearby.

We were allowed to get out of the car on the other side of Hasslo Bridge by the barricaded sound toward Aspo, on the other side of the Kungsholmsgattet channel, which is blocked by the submarine rescue ship, "Belos." It was there they said they had followed a foreign manned submarine for an hour one Sunday afternoon, after which it vanished again.

A sentry from the Kronberg infantry regiment stood on one of the stone fishermen's piers and looked toward Aspo through binoculars. He had placed four hand grenades and a tomato on the municipal sand pile behind him. Swans glided by the bridge while a dog sat beside a boathouse and looked on. Two boys on bicycles came from the Hasslo Gasoline and Service Station and tried to talk to the sentry. A woman came out of a group of houses across from the bridge and took washing off a clothesline.

Darkness began to fall inside the so-called island barrier. The first bang could be heard from the bridge connecting Hasslo with the mainland. Then another bang and at least three more after that.

The drawbridge was opened to let one of the navy patrol boats through. They always toss over some hand grenades. The military people say it prevents frogmen and small submarines from sneaking along and entering or leaving the area.

Small cascades of water could be seen. The sound of the detonations came dully from the arches of the bridge.

"That was a routine move," a girl from the "Daily Echo" program said over her car's radio connection with the editorial section where the bangs could also be heard.

It was the second month of Sweden's biggest submarine hunt to date. Once in a while there was an alarming bang. Something routine. It was hardly enough for the evening news, let alone the evening papers. It was enough to keep the helicopters and patrol boats and thousands of military men and MP's there along with a hotel where even the linen closets were full of journalists with their computers on the bedside tables and their photo labs in the bathrooms.

At times we received high-level visits. The head of the navy was seen on the road to Almo, Admiral Rudberg's ears were unmistakable as seen through the rear window of the Mercedes command car. The Supreme Commander himself, good old General Ljung, rattled in and out of the reconnaissance area in his own helicopter.

There was no sign of the nation's defense minister, Anders Thunborg

First he was in the United States at the invitation of his American colleague, Caspar Weinberger. Then he was home for a few days, just long enough to witness the four-party agreement on an extra 2 billion kronor for the military to spend on submarine hunts, among other things. Then Thunberg went back to the United States again to handle a job he had left over from his period as UN ambassador.

It seems possible to glimpse a rule here: the more war--and war exercises--Swedish defense is involved in, the less reason for Sweden's defense minister to be involved.

After all, the old government leader, Falldin, had to stop his defense minister, Torsten Gustafsson. At long last--after trips to a family reunion in Gotland and to the Norwegian Army's canine training school--Gustafsson headed for Blekinge to take part in handling an actual proven Soviet submarine, the U-137 that ran aground in 1981.

"What the hell is he doing?" Thorbjorn Falldin is said to have demanded when he learned that his defense minister had reserved a seat on the Linjeflyg lunch flight to the Blekinge front.

Gustafsson had to return to Stockholm on the same plane.

In their new book on the U-137 incident, TT news agency journalists Anders Hellberg and Anders Jorle summed up Sweden's recent defense ministers in this way:

"Sweden has had bad luck with its defense ministers. Or perhaps the defense ministers have had bad luck with Sweden.

"The first unfortunate was the mill owner from the small party--Lars de Geer of the Liberal Party. He himself owned part of the defense industry that he was supposed to buy arms from in his capacity as minister. He returned home to Varmland.

"Then came the farmer from the bigger party--Torsten Gustafsson of the Center Party. He said all the things he should not have said on the wrong occasions and to the wrong people. He returned home to Gotland.

"Finally we had the city boss from the biggest party--Social Democrat Borje Andersson. He had no idea what defense is all about. He did not see eye to eye with the prime minister on submarines and had a hard time for that reason. He immediately went home to Dalarna."

Now neither the TT writers nor anyone else has any evidence that Borje Andersson's problems were due to the submarines. Actually, on the very first day of his brief period in office, "Red Borje" went to the navy's truck base while the Harsfjarden surveillance was going on there. But there was so little PR that at any rate SVENSKA DAGBLADET, the newspaper of old majors, missed it.

But Borje Andersson did not get on well anyway. After 3 months he went home to Borlange and home-cooked meals. That is why we now have Anders Thunborg, and how long will he last and how will he fare?

"First I want to say something about submarine hunts," Thunborg said in a lull between two trips to the United States. "I took part in a sub hunt. I was down there last September. The one we call Karlskrona I."

Then this defense minister is getting on well?

At that, Anders Thunborg spoke for a long time, a very long time and quite spontaneously about how well he got along as Sweden's ambassador to the United Nations.

"Those were the 6 nicest years."

He knew that the United Nations and New York would not last forever. Even the Swedish ice hockey players in New York with whom he used to sit in the Madison Square Garden dressing room--Stefan Persson, the Little Prussian, and others--have had to think of changing jobs or calling it quits.

"But joining the government--I quit thinking about that after the 1973 election. I no longer felt like it," Thunborg said with such intensity that the long lock of hair fell forward.

The bangs are what distinguish him most from the man I remember from our first contacts in the 1960's. At the time he worked on everything at Social Democratic Party headquarters at Sveavagen 68. He used to be called the "assistant party secretary by DAGENS NYHETER. He had nothing against that.

The Social Democratic victory in the 1968 election, the last before Thunborg started working for the ministry, is something he does not mind being reminded of. Many people think Thunborg played a decisive role as organizer of the record victory, along with the more Bohemian party secretary and friend from Soder, Sten Andersson.

I was not alone in being impressed by Thunborg's analyses, especially of the young voters who abandoned the Social Democrats in the 1966 election. He was also a speedway star--make the man youth minister, I thought. And instead they shoved him in as undersecretary of defense--not a popular thing among young people at the time--and later named him ambassador and cocktail raconteur at the United Nations skyscraper--a post he also held during the nonsocialist years!

There are Social Democrats working close to Thunborg who think he also wanted to join the government after 1973. But the voices raised against him, including those of Ingvar Carlsson and Thage Peterson, were too strong. When Palme formed his present government in 1982, Thunborg was offered the post of foreign trade minister. He refused. It was too little and too late.

An ironic parenthetical note: two ministers with whom Palme seems especially satisfied today because of their quiet efficiency are the man who eventually became foreign trade minister--Mats Hellstrom--and the man who eventually became defense minister--Anders Thunborg.

"But in 1982 I wanted to continue in the foreign policy administration," said Thunborg as we sat eating a late rare beef sandwich at a restaurant so close to his Ostermalm apartment that he could send the conscript driver home with the car. "It seemed clear that I would be ambassador to Moscow after the United Nations. And then came this...."

This: Borje Andersson's hasty retreat home to Dalarna. Urgent phone calls across the Atlantic.

"It was Sten and Sven who talked me into it," said Thunborg. "Especially Sven. 'You come home and take the job, damn it,' Sven said."

Sten is Sten Andersson, now minister of social affairs, previously party secretary and Thunborg's boss and friend. Sven is Sven Andersson, now retired and acting as submarine investigator, formerly defense and foreign minister and Thunborg's boss and teacher.

But one of Thunborg's close colleagues said:

"Anders can talk about Sven and Sten Andersson as much as he likes. We know who has the most influence on him--Mama Greta."

His father died when Anders was 17. Mama Greta is still alive, almost 80 years old and in poor health. But she was one of Sweden's first women school caretakers and active in politics and the union movement. I met her once at a political meeting for pensioners in Soder. She said proudly that she had visited her son in New York and was thinking of going there again. She had started to learn English.

When Anders Thunborg left Social Democratic field work at the end of the 1960's it was to follow on the heels of veteran Sven Andersson. First to the Ministry of Defense as undersecretary, then as undersecretary in the Foreign Ministry and chairman of a defense study committee.

These were the years when one could sit far into the evening with Andersson and his pupil, Thunborg, in a back room at La Ronde and discuss how to deal with the generals. (The next evening they had the generals in the back room, talking and drinking and discussing how to deal with Social Democratic journalists.)

Thunborg does not hide the fact that he feels he completed his compulsory service in defense during the many years he worked with Sven Andersson. Defense and military interests developed as a secondary theme from Anders Thunborg's involvement in foreign policy in general. He does not make a speech--not even in the middle of an intense submarine hunt--without

repeating the old Osten Unden thesis: "It is a dangerous illusion to think that a small country like Sweden can achieve security through an arms buildup."

This always annoys some admirals as well as Carl Bildt.

Thunborg openly refers to his own current stretch as defense minister as "being commandeered" and as a "refresher maneuver"--his long month of follow-up military training.

What will he do when he is demobilized?

"I would like to return to the Foreign Ministry. Or something with the United Nations. But now I have to go home to bed. At 8 tomorrow the young man with the car will be there. I have to go to Orebro and speak at the conference on conscription. But then I will go back to New York again. Spring in Manhattan."

He said that his diplomatic work from the United Nations flowed in and out of his Defense Ministry office. Was it true that the Soviet foreign minister asked for him in particular when he was here at the security conference?

"Asked for me? Gromyko? He cornered me at a reception and assured me specifically that there would be no more submarine violations."

Thunborg stubbed out the last Kent of the evening. He is so addicted to his cigarettes that he has to sit outside the government conference room and have a smoke like a schoolboy.

I thought of the cigarette smoke that rose over Sweden's defense when it was at its most Swedish, one afternoon in early spring.

The defense minister's program for the day was to talk about a "Soldier's Recollections" to 180 draftees who had just joined the Home Fleet. They filled the old navy church at Skeppsholmen. The seamen sat closest to the front, then the lieutenants and captains and Commander Emil Svensson, known from radio and TV as an almost invincible sub hunter. And there were the naval flags by the altar and the ship models hanging from the ceiling and lit candles and somewhere up there, hardly visible at 168 cm, was former speedway driver and part-time infantry soldier Anders Thunborg, almost 50 years old, who was going to give the boys a word on their way to defend their fatherland.

Only snatches could be heard echoing under the dome, as in a liturgy: "Strong defense...neutrality...with firmness and resolution." Naturally the hymn was "A Mighty Fortress is our God." It ended with the fine naval review march, which I myself heard so many times when I was a draftee at Skeppsholmen.

But by then the defense minister was already on his way out to the car-- finally he could get a smoke!

He almost disappeared inside the gray jacket that covered an increasingly thin and wiry body. He relaxed as he blew the cigarette smoke out, but wrinkled his brow again when he talked with a colleague about defense negotiations, which had not yet been settled.

Time after time this spring, he has been heard to say:

"Much more cooperation across party lines is needed. Not just on defense issues. Instead they just dig the trenches even deeper."

He has colleagues who think Thunborg is one of the few Social Democrats in the government who find it easy to talk to Falldin. And if it is not Thunborg talking to Falldin, there are others who have to talk for the Social Democrats on defense issues. Particularly undersecretary Ulf Larsson, who sits quite close to Palme but used to be undersecretary in the Defense Ministry, just like Thunborg. Thunborg was often praised in the nonsocialist press during the spring defense negotiations as a more amenable kind of Social Democrat. He had nothing against that.

"He can still react like a hardbitten Social Democrat at any time. It is in his marrow," said one of his closest colleagues in the Defense Ministry.

"Think about the time we were in Washington," recalled the colleague.

"There was a formal dinner at the home of the Swedish ambassador. Later that evening I saw three men who went into a corner to talk. They were Wille Wachtmeister, ambassador and count, Peter Wallenberg, heir to a financial empire, and Anders Thunborg, worker's son from Soder. What a picture of our democracy!"

Will this defense minister try to build up armaments in Sweden? Or will he try to reduce armaments? In public Thunborg says that he does not intend to do either. In commenting on the latest defense settlement in a lecture at the Social Democratic ABF [expansion unknown] building, he said that "it cannot be called an arms buildup in any reasonable sense of the term." On the other hand--Thunborg the diplomat!--the agreement will "prevent the unacceptable arms reduction that would otherwise have been the result of the rise in the exchange rate of the dollar if it had had its full impact on the purchasing power of the armed forces."

Thunborg obviously refuses to be drawn along in the change in favor of a strong Swedish arms buildup that is going on among some other Social Democrats in his generation--those who were actively in favor of checking military spending in the 1960's.

I talked to a man who was a leader in the 1960's and is now in the Finance Ministry (which has always meant more for Swedish defense policy than the Defense Ministry). Reducing defense spending was the right thing to do in

the 1960's, he said. "After all we had more airplanes than France and England put together." But now we "need" a new trend shift--upward. This economist who also has international experience went so far as to assert that the submarine incidents would not have taken place if Sweden had maintained its arms level.

I looked up a Social Democratic defense bureaucrat, Ingemar Engman, with 12 years in defense behind him, among other things as head of the materiel unit, and one of Thunborg's close colleagues. Now he has gone over to the big arms supplier, Bofors, via the Metalworkers' Industrial Union, and takes a hard line when writing in SVENSKA DAGBLADET:

"Since we have deliberately undermined defense power for a number of years, it should now be time to reinforce it again. This could be quite decisive when it comes to bringing about what we so fervently desire, namely staying out of a major conflict between the superpowers in Europe."

I read political veteran Gunnar Sjöstedt's new contribution to the debate, "Sweden--Small and Weak?" which everyone in the so-called defense debate says one should read. Sjöstedt's thesis is that Sweden's international influence has diminished in the last 20 years, partly because Sweden's military strength has declined. Sjöstedt believes that the neutral freedom from alliances could be replaced by one of three bleak alternatives: Sweden could join an alliance, become the "client state" of some large power or "simply become a battleground for the political struggles of the superpowers."

Anders Thunborg has not been carried away by this kind of heightened debate mood. (He does not seem to have read Sjöstedt. What does he read anyway? Does he go to any movies?) He is hardly carried away by any debate. (But he does not conceal his pride in having won the debate on the new JAB [fighter-bomber-reconnaissance] combat plane in the Stockholm working-class district, traditionally a group critical of the military where a minority would like to follow "arms reduction minister" Maj Britt Theorin.)

Well, back to the late evening when we ate rare beef sandwiches at the restaurant near his Ostermalm apartment. At 8 o'clock the next morning the conscript chauffeur would turn up. Another official job. Then off to New York for a week!

His wife was already waiting for him there; she thought she might as well stay there after the last trip to the United States. On that evening in the dreary Stockholm restaurant he was accompanied by one of his two daughters from a previous marriage. Annika had just finished school, was working in a bank but would rather talk about how to become a journalist.

"Tell all your secrets now, Dieter," said her father. "Tell about the time you came from Lund and we fought together in the Social Democratic Student League." "If you, Anders, will tell about the time you ordered that election song about the Social Democrat who floated through life on an air

mattress." "Oh, for heaven's sake," said the defense minister. "But do you remember Svante Foerster's 40th anniversary to which everybody came? Sten Andersson made a speech and I sang Fred Winter hits and now Svante is dead...."

No, there was not much deep thinking about new ideas for defense and security policy that evening at the Ostermalm restaurant. When will there be?

A little way beyond Ostermalm, out on Lidingovagen, lies the enormous military staff building, the Bastion. "Sweden's Pentagon." Anders Thunborg was invited to a lunch meeting there by the local Social Democratic association at this employment site which has 1200 workers.

It was held in the ground floor conference room which looked like the projection room of an American movie company. Outside in the hall was a booth selling snacks and soft drinks and a display of colorful books in English on "Watchdogs of the Sea" and "Airplanes in World War III." Inside the hall some Social Democratic banners had been hung up: "More Jobs--Less Inflation."

Over a hundred people turned up. A new attendance record for the association. Some were in uniform. Their commander in chief and the heads of the defense branches were sitting a few stories up in the command offices. But departing army chief Nils Skold attended the meeting, sitting in the first row in a civilian blazer. Skold, a longtime organized Social Democrat and now an expert in the Defense Ministry, studied his new chief, Thunborg.

The defense negotiations had reached a decisive stage. The armed forces had started a new submarine hunt. The stage was set for a perfect defense debate in the heart of the Swedish Pentagon among the people who were most involved. Now they had the defense minister himself in their midst. The meeting began.

The chairman of the local Social Democratic association, a very civilian bearded man who handles MBL [workers' management participation rights] matters, began by telling the captains and majors, who may not attend Social Democratic job site meetings often, what this association does:

"We have specifically drawn the attention of the authorities to the poor transportation connections to the staff building here. Some comrades from Vasby in Uppland have to get up at 5 o'clock in the morning to get here. But we have high hopes for a revision in the bus route 55 schedule. And now I will turn the floor over to the defense minister."

Thunborg went to the speaker's platform. It went almost up to his shoulders. The bangs are the most visible part of him. Who wears schoolboy bangs like that nowadays? Where did he get that hairdo? Stig Dagerman at Soder Latin School? Per Oscarsson?

He gave about the same speech he had delivered a few days earlier in Storlien. to the touring men's club that goes under the name of the Swedish Defense Debate.

(I have not forgotten a night at the Hogfjall Hotel in Storlien. We sat in the room of Stig Synnergren, then commander in chief and now chief of the royal aides-de-camp. We had something in our bathroom glasses. Now and then General Synnergren looked at his nylon shirt which was hanging in the bathroom to dry. I will never see Anders Thunborg washing nylon shirts in a hotel room.)

In his speech--in all his speeches--Thunborg made several references to his period as UN ambassador. He likes to tell about the first time he went to New York when the exchange rate of the dollar was 4 kronor and 8 ore.

He concluded abruptly in his somewhat forced and hearty voice: "There is, after all, no reason for us to see the future in a dark light." Time for questions. Now, in the heart of the Swedish defense establishment, the defense debate would begin.

The first question concerned personnel attrition and pensions. A woman from the "social unit" asked how defense employees could keep their spirits up in these times of "cutbacks and large-scale operations." An officer stood at attention and asked if there were any plans to merge the staffs of the various defense branches.

"Now we're getting down to the essentials," Thunborg's information secretary Bo Eriksson, on loan from the Foreign Ministry, whispered to me.

He was just waiting for someone to ask the fateful question of whether all military men would be forced to wear the same gray uniforms. No one was expecting fateful questions about Russian submarines and American overflights and medium-range missiles and nuclear-free zones.

Thunborg answered extensively with many details from all his years in defense. He woke up, began to point with his finger and strike his narrow chest with clenched fists. They seemed to be listening attentively, but then he looked at the time:

"We have a government meeting at 1 o'clock. I'll have to run."

The gray Saab with the military markings was waiting outside with the engine running and the always-ready conscript chauffeur at the wheel.

"Hop in," said Thunborg and we drove toward town.

Finally--a cigarette! He sank into his gray typically Manhattan jacket. He put his diplomatic briefcase on his knees. Only a Bogart hat was missing. Or didn't he resemble James Cagney more, the big little tough guy of the movies, like a pistol butt on the outside, but with a heart of--what, marzipan, a coiled spring?

We drove toward the Defense Ministry near the palatial bank on Gustav Adolf Square.

"Can you drop me here?" I said and the draftee stopped the car in Brunkeberg Square.

A girl on the sidewalk stretched her stocking-clad leg toward the open car door--in the middle of the day--and asked vaguely:

"Do you want to have some fun?"

Almost like New York!

Background Data

1934: Anders Thunborg born on 9 June in the Soder district of Stockholm.

1954: graduated from Soder Latin School.

1954-58: university studies, then worked for the labor movement.

1958: ombudsman in Stockholm labor district.

1961-69: employed at Social Democratic Party headquarters.

1969: undersecretary in the Defense Ministry under Sven Andersson.

1975: undersecretary in the Foreign Ministry.

1974-75: chairman of the 1974 defense study committee.

1976: Sweden's ambassador to the United Nations in New York.

1983: called home as minister of defense.

Anders Thunborg has been chairman of the UN nuclear weapons study group, the Trust Fund for South Africa, vice president of the UN General Assembly and the secretary general's representative on humanitarian efforts in Lebanon.

From 1969 to 1976 he was chairman of the Swedish Motorcycle Society after he stopped riding himself. Family: Anders Thunborg married for the first time in the early 1960's and had two daughters. In 1976 he married Ingalill nee Holm, nicknamed Lillan, who has three sons of her own.

6578

CSO: 3650/210

MILITARY

SWEDEN

BOFORS ACCUSED OF LEGAL VIOLATIONS IN MISSILE SALE TO BAHRAIN

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 May 84 p 6

[Article by Mats Carlhom: "Bofors Is Reported to the Police: 'Sold Missiles to Bahrain'"]

[Text] "Bofors has smuggled antiaircraft missiles to two Arab countries on the Persian Gulf. The smuggling took place via Singapore and was a deliberate violation of the law by the managing director of the company, now head of SAF [Swedish Employers' Confederation], Claes-Ulrik Winberg, among others."

This was claimed by the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Association which on Tuesday reported Bofors to the police for violation of the law against smuggling of goods.

The smuggling of weapons is alleged to have happened on two occasions, 1979 and 1980, and involved an antiaircraft system worth a total of 60 million kroner.

In support of its complaint Swedish Peace presented, among other things, an excerpt from Bofors' secret customer register, and internal Bofors part on the coding system for customer designation and order forms.

The two countries concerned are Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, two small states on the Persian Gulf. The official Swedish position during recent years has been very restrictive on the export of weapons to countries in the Middle East.

In 1978 Bofors applied to the then Minister of Trade Stellan Burenstam-Linder with an inquiry about permission to export Missile 70 to the two countries. The answer was no.

to Singapore

Instead the firm (did not officially to sell) the weapons to a state company in Singapore, Thales International, which in turn sold them further to

Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, according to the association in its report to the police.

"We are entirely sure that the affair went forward in this manner," said Lars Jederlund, who participated in producing the information. "We are also entirely sure that at least 32 people at Bofors were aware of the smuggling."

The documents now disclosed show how Bofors designated its customer countries by codes. For the export of Missile 70 there were 9 customers, designated with the figures 1-9.

Singapore is the only country on the list with three numbers. In reality Bahrain is "Customer 2" and the United Arab Emirates is "Customer 3" according to Swedish Peace.

'Certain Source'

"We have a very certain source for this. Furthermore we have another document which indicates that the United Arab Emirates has 13 field sights for Missile 70. That agrees with one of the order forms which we delivered to the police."

It was said that that document can not be made public by the association at this time as it would reveal the secret source.

"Eventually we can present it for the prosecutor in a later phase," said Lars Jederlund.

The order forms and the customer register indicate that the missiles, field sights and other equipment were sold to the firm Unicorn International in Singapore.

According to several sources the firm has the primary task of marketing war material on the export market.

Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates are listed in the parts of the customer register which is now being made public.

'Confusion'

Information that the Swedish antiaircraft system was in the two countries has long been circulated in military journals, and that they were brought there via Singapore.

According to a statement by Foreign Trade Minister Mats Hellstrom on 1 April this year, there was confusion with an English missile.

On Tuesday neither Bofors Managing Director Claes-Ulrik Winberg nor Foreign Trade Minister Mats Hellstrom would comment on the information.

"We are waiting to see the documents which were turned in," said Bofors Chief of Information Ulla Carlstrom. "Then our lawyers will take a position on the matter."

9287

CSO: 3650/212

EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATION SUGGESTS REDUCED WORK WEEK

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Mar 84 Sect III p 10

[Article by Svend Bie]

[Text] The new trial balloon floated by the Danish Employers Association has been given a mixed reception by the labor unions. No union has refused to discuss the proposal, but many are unsympathetic.

The new trial balloon from the Danish Employers' Association (DA) on working hours--a proposed general agreement between LO (Danish Federation of Trade Unions) and DA on working hours, with more detailed agreements at individual workplaces--has been given a mixed reception by the unions.

A reduction in the workweek has been announced as the unions' main demand in the upcoming contract negotiations. Up until now, the Danish Employers' Association has advocated free negotiations on this topic: it would be up to the individual wage earners and employers to determine how many hours and which hours would be worked.

Now, however, the Danish Employers' Association has changed its plan. It is now emphasizing a general agreement between LO and DA. This already has elicited a positive response from HK (Union of Retail Business and Clerical Workers), while others are more reserved.

National chairman Hans Jensen of the Tin and Pipeworkers Union told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that his participation in the debate over working hours would be based on two principles: 1) a job must provide an income that a family can live on and 2) the largest possible number of problems should be solved locally. As a result, he is not fundamentally opposed to letting individual plants decide how many hours and which hours employees will work, but employers must loosen their grip on the union's members, he said.

"If these questions are to be decided by decentralized negotiations, then they must be genuinely decentralized. If the companies in our industry are controlled by Norre Voldgade (Association of Iron Industry Employers, Ed.) then the system will be worthless," said Hans Jensen, who pointed out that employers have had tight control over wages during the present contract.

National chairman Bendt Jensen of the Bricklayers' Union totally rejects local decisions concerning working hours.

"This system cannot work in the construction industry. When work is underway, it goes according to a tight schedule. This work involves many people: crane operators, truck drivers, and even people in other companies. These questions may be decided locally in other industries, but not in construction. I do not believe employers in this industry would like such a system, either," said Bendt Jensen. If the purpose of local agreements on working hours is to shorten the workweek, then Bendt Jensen has a simple solution: "The 40-hour week can simply be reduced to 35 hours. In this way, we could avoid all the negotiations. It would be much simpler. But we are interested in reducing the workweek, so of course we will look at the new plan from DA."

The DA plan has been relatively well received by HK. National chairman Jorgen Eiberg told BORSEN that he saw the new plan from DA as a good beginning.

"This is completely different from what we have been hearing from DA. Previously, DA has talked about eliminating steady working hours completely," said Jorgen Eiberg, in reference to DA's proposal of a general agreement with LO on working hours.

9336

CSO: 3613/117

BRIEFS

VIETNAM CEMENT PLANT COMPLETED--One of Denmark's largest aid projects in Vietnam, an ultramodern cement plant in Hoang Thach 130 km east of Hanoi, was officially opened last weekend, according to the Vietnamese Communist Party newspaper Nhan Dan. The plant was designed by F. L. Smidth, which signed a contract with the Vietnamese authorities in 1976. The Danish portion of the project was financed with government loans of 150 million kroner. Danida participated in the project. It took 8 years to construct the plant, compared to 3 years under normal conditions. The delays were blamed on difficult soil conditions on the small island where the plant is located and other factors. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 20 Mar 84 Sect III p 3] 9336

CSO: 3613/117

LABOR LEADER ON COMBATING YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 19 Apr 84 p 5

[Article by A. Christodoulidou: "8-Billion-Drachma Barrage to Combat Unemployment"]

[Text] With a "barrage" of new, expanded programs, OAED [Labor Force Employment Organization] is being launched on one more campaign to combat unemployment. A total of 8.2 billion drachmas will be spent on this attempt.

As Theod. Katsanevas, the direct of OAED, announced yesterday:

OAED's new programs are already being applied. Following a decision by the minister of labor, Evangelos Giannopoulos, the new program of compensation to employers for the creation of new jobs in private and public companies and corporations is already materializing. This program hopes to create 9,000 permanent jobs in 1984. On the other hand:

The program of subsidizing employment in public construction of construction workers and workers for municipalities and communities is being expanded. Through this program, it is expected that 10,000 to 15,000 construction workers will find temporary jobs, thus dealing with the most crucial part of the unemployment situation.

Basic Programs

Mr Katsanevas also indicated that both of the announced basic programs for subsidized employment are significantly improved over those of the past year--as much in duration as in the amount of subsidy for each job. More specifically:

The subsidizing of new hirings from OAED will last for 1 year instead of 6 months, as was the case in the past.

Each construction workers or unskilled worker hired by a municipality, community or public company will be subsidized by 1,000 drachmas per day if the unemployed worker is compensated by OAED and 600 drachmas for a noncompensated worker. For hired foremen, the employer will be subsidized with approximately 1,500 drachmas.

Every new hiring by private companies is subsidized for 1 year at 700 drachmas per day, when companies that export or produce high technology, as well as public companies and corporations, are involved.

The subsidy is 600 drachmas for the rest of industry and small businesses and 400 drachmas for trade and service establishments.

For the hiring of women in all of the above instances, an extra 100 drachmas per day is provided.

For the hiring of repatriated immigrants or political refugees, 800 drachmas per day are provided.

Every hiring of a handicapped person or discharged prisoner is subsidized at 1,000 drachmas per day.

Education

In addition to the above two programs, which, as previously noted, will contribute to the permanent or temporary employment of at least 20,000 unemployed persons, OAED in addition will provide accelerated training for 27,000 more, either through its schools or through programs run by the private companies. At the same time, the organization will help meet the problems of the handicapped by financing special programs of vocational training and employment for 1,000 handicapped persons.

It should be noted that of the total cost of OAED's programs--8.2 billion drachmas--the organization's share will be 2.8 billion, while the European Community Fund will contribute 3.3 billion and the rest will be paid for by the employers.

The director of OAED further emphasized that through the programs, it is believed that unemployment, which is already showing a decline, will be dealt with more effectively. Mr Katsanevas reported that, indeed, for the first time in many years, OAED's official unemployment figure was held at 5 percent in the first quarter of 1984, compared with 5.13 percent in the corresponding period of the previous year. Similar favorable trends are reflected in other basic statistics.

12542

CSO: 3521/249

COMMERCE SECRETARY DE VELASCO ON VITAL ROLE OF EXPORTS

Madrid ABC in Spanish 21 May 84 p 31

[Article by Luis De Velasco, secretary of commerce]

[Text] Exports are responsible for two-thirds of our growth and for the lessened elimination of jobs in industry. In this article the secretary of commerce and president of the INFE [National Institute for the Promotion of Exports] analyzes the causes which have led to the spectacular growth of our sales abroad. He predicts that in 1984 exports will continue to play a very important role in the growth of Spain's GDP [Gross Domestic Product]. To achieve these results, he calls for perseverance in the joint and committed efforts now being made.

The favorable growth of Spain's exports since the second quarter of last year and changing trends in the exchange rate of the peseta since the end of 1982 have led some people to the conclusion that the depreciation of our currency over the past year is the cause of this increase in exports. That is certainly true, but it is just one part of the truth. There are a number of aspects that must be considered.

First of all, for the purposes of a more accurate analysis, it is essential to take into account not only trends in the peseta-dollar exchange rate, but also the actual position of the peseta. This can be obtained by weighing the value which different currencies used in foreign trade have in Spain's foreign trade. Since the end of 1982 the depreciation of our currency in relation to the dollar has been greater than its decline in value in relation to the other currencies included in this index. Therefore, the actual nominal depreciation of the peseta has been less than its decline in value in relation to the U.S. currency.

The exchange rate, measured in this way, has been and still is, without any doubt, a fundamental factor in the export surge, with

the corresponding time lag. We must remember, though, that it has made our exports cheaper, and has therefore improved the competitive position of our products, but it has also made our imports more expensive, and was a factor contributing to inflation in 1983, estimated at 3 percentage points. This causes a worsening in our competitive position.

General Economic Policy

So far the argument is correct, and it is one that can be found in any textbook on international trade. But international trade in practice is something more than what is described in textbooks. For that reason, we have to remember other factors as well, in addition to the exchange rate. Let's take a look at what we feel are some of the most important of these factors.

In order to export, it is necessary to produce exportable merchandise. That is neither a redundant nor an overly obvious statement. There are many requirements for producing exportable merchandise. One of these is price. One factor determining price is the exchange rate. But there are also other factors that have an impact on the production and marketing costs of any business.

An economic policy like the one our government is pursuing, which seeks wage restraints, a reduction in social security costs, a reduction in financial costs, and which in the end produces, as our policy is producing, a decline in inflation, is a policy providing the essential bases for producing competitive, and therefore, exportable merchandise.

Thus, in addition to the exchange rate policy, there are also, within the limits of what is possible, general economic policy measures, which are not limited to what was stated above, but which also include other aspects that are no less important, such as the reconversion and reindustrialization policy, or the research and development policy.

A second statement that may also seem obvious: it is not enough to produce exportable merchandise. In addition, this merchandise must actually be exported. This is a job that is always difficult (a good piece of fabric that is left lying in a chest does not get sold, contrary to what the old saying claims). Exporting has become much more difficult in recent years with a surplus production capacity in many sectors in a great number of countries, lowered demand, and international trade with zero or negative real growth rates up to last year. In today's international trade, competition is very strong, and we have to face unfair practices, restrictions, etc., every day.

Stimulus and Promotion Policy

All this makes clear the importance of our policy of promoting and stimulating exports and of its day to day applications, which are not spectacular, and do not make headlines. But, without any doubt, this policy is another of the causes behind the boom in exports in our country. Other factors, in addition to price, are also essential in exports: financing and credit, quality and image of quality, information about the exporter, trade and financial negotiations, trade fairs and missions, consultation, improved management of the INFE and of trade offices abroad, etc. Without these factors, even though competitive in terms of price, our exports would be much lower.

All of the above, including these two types of policies, are still not sufficient for exporting: the exporter is still needed. The preceding is a framework which must be filled in with the exporting activity of public and private enterprise. Businessmen must pay increasing attention to exports and not consider foreign markets as something marginal, but rather as an important element in their volume of business, and they must adapt their activity and business organization to the goal of establishing, raising, and expanding their foreign clientele. Undoubtedly, they have been doing this in growing numbers for some years but that is still not sufficient. The workers and unions are now coming to understand that wage restraint is one--an important, but only one--of the elements for producing competitive and exportable merchandise, something fundamental for our nation's economy.

Joint Effort

For this reason, exporting is a joint endeavor, a hard job, one which demands continuing efforts on many fronts and by all economic agents. Because it is a key factor. In 1983, exports were responsible for two-thirds of our growth and for the lessened elimination of jobs in industry. In 1984, a very large part of the growth in our total product, and we must hope, in the creation of jobs in industry will be due to exports, both directly and indirectly.

Some time ago Spain lost its comparative price advantage in a great many sectors. Every time that happens, other factors become even more important.

Exports still account for barely 13 percent of the GDP, a percentage under the average of the OECD [Organization for

Economic Cooperation and Development] countries. Therefore, there is room for growth and for continuing to obtain a larger share of the world's trade. Only a joint and committed effort and an appropriate export policy will make this possible. The recovery of international trade will aid this program. That is a necessary condition, but one to which must be added domestic measures such as those described above, which will enable a large part of this growth to be absorbed.

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CSO: 3548/258

FIVE COUNTRIES WILL PROVIDE OIL; NEW DEI PLANT PLANNED

Oil Purchases

Athens ETHNOS in Greek 18 Mar 84 p 17

/Text/ The intergovernment program for the country's oil supplies closed with the signing of an agreement for the purchase of 900,000 tons of crude oil from Libya. All in all, there have been agreements with five countries for purchases of 6.5 million tons of crude oil.

According to a statement by Minister of Energy Evangelos Kouloumbis, the only thing left is to complete the discussions with Oman and Kuwait from which we will purchase only small quantities. The minister noted that this is the first time the program for oil purchases has been completed so early.

Specifically, on the basis of the concluded agreements, our country will purchase 1 million tons from Iraq, 1.8 million from the Soviet Union, 1.5 million from Saudi Arabia and 910,000 tons from Algeria.

The agreement with Libya provides for the possibility of purchasing another 300,000 tons up to March 1985. This oil, because of its low sulphur content, will be used in the Attiki area to limit pollution and the "cloud", especially during the summer months.

New DEI Power Plant

Athens ETHNOS in Greek 18 May 84 p 17

/Text/ DEI is planning to construct a big power plant in Aliveri, of Evvoia, using coal. This unit, if it is eventually constructed, will be the first coal-burning plant and will have an estimated capacity of 500 megawatts.

Minister of Energy and Natural Resources E. Kouloumbis, who was asked yesterday, replied that the matter is under study by DEI and that soon the final decisions will be made.

The location of the plant in Eliveri is considered appropriate for the transportation and unloading of the coal since there are modern installations there and it also has the special terminal of AGET-IRAKLIS.

The total quantity of coal needed for the operation of the unit is estimated at 3 million tons a year. Currently, coal is imported in smaller quantities and is being used in a mixture with lignite for the DEI plants with satisfactory results.

Following this year's rainfall, the DEI dams reached satisfactory levels. Kouloumbis said Wednesday night that the water reserves of the lakes reached 1,494 gigawatt hours compared to 844 gwh at the corresponding date in 1983.

Compared to 1981, which was a year with good rainfall (1,800 gwh), this year's level is very good, the minister said, a fact which will have favorable effects on the production of electricity, and will make energy imports unnecessary.

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OPINION POLL: WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR ENVIRONMENT EFFORT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 29 Apr 84 p 7

[Text] Finns consider environmental protection and pollution problems to be very important. Of those who responded in an opinion poll, 98 percent felt that these matters are important. The data were revealed in the "Finns and the Environment" poll conducted by the Statistics Center.

According to the poll, 60 percent of all Finns are of the opinion that government officials ought to use more money for environmental protection.

The respondents felt that environmental protection is more important than improving pensions and social security. However, reducing unemployment was felt to be a more important issue than even environmental protection.

Nearly half of all Finns would place environmental protection foremost, even in the event that economic growth should suffer because of it. Thirty-five percent felt that economic growth and environmental protection are possible at the same time.

Only 11 percent would place economic growth foremost, even in the event that the environment should suffer. Two-thirds of them felt that environmental protection is more important than keeping prices from rising or increasing consumption potential.

People Concerned over Entire Environment of Finland

The respondents were more concerned over the environmental problems of all of Finland than the environments of their own communities. Matters of greater concern at the level of the entire country are damages caused by oil, the removal of hazardous waste, nuclear power plant waste and food additives.

In one's own community the quality of lake and river water, overly dense construction and air pollution are of most concern.

Southern Finns and city dwellers are more concerned over matters in their own communities than others. They are distressed over noise, air pollution, waste handling and the destruction of our cultural and historical environment.

Less than a third felt that the current state of the environment in Finland is good, about 40 percent satisfactory and less than a fourth poor.

The opinion poll was based on Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recommendations. Over 2,000 people from 15 to 74 years of age responded to the opinion poll. The interviews were conducted by phone.

Analogous polls have been conducted before in Japan, the United States and the EC countries. The purpose of the poll was to supplement data describing the state of the environment with citizens' opinions.

Finnish placed the problems presented to them in the following order of importance: reduction of unemployment, environmental protection, improvement of pensions and social security, keeping prices from rising, development of environment-conserving methods of production, improvement of the housing situation, reduction of the number of products harmful to the environment, equalization of differences in income, more effective consumer protection, shifting of decision-making closer to individual citizens, reduction of differences in local development, control over multinational companies and strengthening of military defense capability.

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